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NOTES AND COMMENTS
PAKISTAN: A TEST CASE FOR UNITED STATES
NONPROLIFERATION LAWS
Myron A. Brilliant*
INTRODUCTION
The United States has always supported international efforts to curb
the spread of nuclear weapons.' The goal of the United States is to
establish a comprehensive international strategy for addressing the
problem of nuclear proliferation.' As current trends attest, however, it
is difficult for the United States to apply this broad objective in isolated
situations.3
* J.D. Candidate, 1989, Washington College of Law, The American University.
1. Scheinman, An Evaluation of Non-Proliferation Policies: Retrospect and Pros-
pect, 4 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 355, 355 (1983). A central theme in United
States security and foreign policy is the avoidance of the spread of nuclear weapons.
Id.; e.g., NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION: PROSPECTS FOR CONTROL 131-32 (B. Boskey &
M. Willrich eds. 1970) (explaining that the United States supports a general non-
proliferation treaty); G. QUESTER, THE POLTICS OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 28-32
(1973) (expressing the concern of the United States to control nuclear weapons). The
major international efforts to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons include the following:
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Oct. 26, 1956, 8 U.S.T. 1093,
T.I.A.S. No. 3873, 276 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force for the United States on July
29, 1954); the Antarctic Treaty, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4789, 402 U.N.T.S. 71
(entered into force on June 23, 1986); the Test Ban Treaty, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.IA.S.
No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 (entered into force on Oct. 10, 1963); Treaty for the Prohi-
bition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Feb. 14, 1967, 22 U.S.T. 347, T.I.A.S.
No. 7137, 634 U.N.T.S. 281; Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 21
U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 (signed in Washington, London, and
Moscow on July 1, 1968) [hereinafter NPT]. The United States is a signatory of all of
these major international agreements.
2. See Stoiber, Current United States Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy, 4 N.Y.L.
SCH. J. INT'L & Comip. L. 367, 368 (1983) (explaining that an important United
States policy objective is to strengthen and support international nonproliferation in-
struments). But see Scheinman, supra note 1, at 356 (stating that the Reagan adminis-
tration's strategy for achieving nonproliferation goals has shifted away from a compre-
hensive global strategy toward a more selective and discriminatory approach).
3. Yager, Influencing Incentives and Capabilities, in NON-PROLIFERATION AND
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 407 (J. Yager ed. 1980) [hereinafter Yager, Incentives and Ca-
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The development of independent indigenous nuclear programs4 in
high risk countries5 best illustrates the inherent limitations of interna-
tional nonproliferation efforts. These countries, for a variety of eco-
nomic, political, and national security reasons,6 are currently pursuing
nuclear weapons capability. The restraints once associated with devel-
oping nuclear weapons no longer effectively deter these states, therefore
pabilities]. The United States nonproliferation objectives are adjusted to particular
countries and may create too much differentiation among countries and thus be viewed
as unjust discrimination. See generally Note, Nuclear Non-Proliferation for the 80s:
Carrot and Stick Policy Reexamined, 13 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 25, 41-52 (1987)
[hereinafter Carrot and Stick Policy] (discussing the sharp conflict between United
States nonproliferation goals and the nonproliferation goals of Pakistan and South
Africa).
4. Carrot and Stick Policy, supra note 3, at 33 n.62. Indigenous nuclear facilities
are those created entirely by the state and do not depend on nuclear assistance from
other nations. Id. These programs generally develop at a slow pace. D. PONEMAN, Nu-
CLEAR POWER IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 51 (1982). Independent atomic energy
efforts, usually of the highest governmental priority often generate intense press inter-
est and vociferous assertions of independence by national leaders. Id. at 49-51.
5. Ausness, Putting the Genie Back in the Bottle: U.S. Controls Over Sensitive
Nuclear Technology, 16 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcON. 65, 70-71 (1981). "High
risk" countries are those countries that represent a problem for nuclear nonprolifera-
tion efforts because they are on the verge of acquiring nuclear capability. Id. Most of
these "high risk" countries face major foreign challenges or internal domestic chal-
lenges which affect their stability. Id.; see also Merlini, Problem Countries, in THE
NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS AND NON-PROLIFERATION 155 (1985) (outlining the general
characteristics of current and potential problem countries that pose a threat to nuclear
nonproliferation). Countries that display an open determination to acquire nuclear
weapons, that are not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weap-
ons (NPT), and that consistently develop sensitive nuclear technologies, are considered
current high risk countries. Id.
6. Comment, Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation and Its Control, 6 DEN. J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 159, 169 (1976) [hereinafter Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation]. The
most prominent factors to foster the development of nuclear explosion capabilities in
non-nuclear states are: (1) the need to maintain or increase security; (2) the desire for
greater international prestige; and (3) the need for independent energy sources. Id. at
177-79. Countries may use peaceful nuclear explosives in excavating procedures, stimu-
lating natural gas recovery, and creating underground caverns for oil and gas storage.
Long, Peaceful Nuclear Explosions, 32 BULL. ATOM. SCI., 18, 21-26 (1976).
The main political consideration is the desire to enhance prestige and influence.
Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation, supra, at 175-77. The possession of nuclear weap-
ons guarantees a country greater independence by preventing to some degree super-
power interference in its affairs. STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTI-
TUTE: PREVENTING NUCLEAR WEAPON PROLIFERATION 7 (1975) [hereinafter SIPRI:
PREVENTING PROLIFERATION]. By becoming nuclear powers, The People's Republic of
China and India gained influence, prestige, and a degree of political independence.
Epstein, The Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, SCI. AM., Apr. 1975, at 18, 22.
The most important consideration, however, in the development of nuclear weapons
is national security. Ausness, supra note 5, at 69. The acquisition of nuclear weapons is
perceived as providing security against a nuclear attack as well as against an attack by
conventional forces. Id. Nuclear weapons can also enable smaller countries to gain mil-
itary superiority in their regions. W. EPSTEIN, THE LAST CHANCE: NUCLEAR
PROLIFERATION & ARMS CONTROL 19 (1976).
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international efforts to curb wider dissemination of nuclear weapons
have become increasingly more difficult.'
Pakistan exemplifies the limitations of international nonproliferation
efforts. A non-nuclear state on the verge of becoming a nuclear state,8
Pakistan is considered a high risk country." Its nuclear policy is not
governed by international nonproliferation treaties.10 Despite interna-
tional efforts to slow the spread of nuclear weapons, Pakistan continues
to acquire valuable nuclear technology and materials."1 Pakistan pro-
vides an important test case for United States nonproliferation policies.
While United States-Pakistan relations appeared to improve during
the 1980s, Pakistan continued acquiring nuclear weapon capability. 2
7. SIPRI: PREVENTING PROLIFERATION, supra note 6, at 7. The cost of building a
nuclear weapons program and the lack of technological expertise are no longer effective
barriers to prevent nations from acquiring nuclear weapons. Id. Other significant limi-
tations in the implementation of an effective international nonproliferation policy are
that non-military nuclear energy can be converted to military use; that international
law cannot compel nations to comply with nuclear regulations; and that nuclear non-
proliferation treaties tend to discriminate against non-nuclear states. Carrot and Stick
Policy, supra note 3, at 37. See SIPRI: PREVENTING PROLIFERATION, supra note 6, at
5 (describing that cost and technical expertise are no longer barriers to prevent nations
from acquiring nuclear weapons). The NPT is difficult to maintain because of the vary-
ing political and security interests of so many countries. Id.
8. L. SPECTOR, THE NEw NUCLEAR NATIONS, 113 (1985) [hereinafter SPECTOR,
NUCLEAR NATIONS]; Albright, Pakistan's Bomb-Making Capacity, 43 BuLL. ATo.I.
Sc. 30 (1987); Doerner, Knocking at the Nuclear Door, TIME, Mar. 30, 1987, at 42.
9. Ausness, supra note 5, at 70 (noting that Pakistan has refused to sign the Nu-
clear Non-Proliferation Treaty). See Merlini, supra note 5, at 162 (citing evidence that
implicates Pakistan as a current proliferation risk).
10. Carrot and Stick Policy, supra note 3, at 41. Because Pakistan has not signed
the NPT, it is under no legal duty to refrain from developing nuclear weapons. Aus-
ness, supra note 5, at 70.
Pakistan's nuclear diplomacy suggests a willingness to cooperate with international
nonproliferation treaties and obligations when India agrees to international treaties and
obligations. INSTITUTE OF REGIONAL STUDIES, ISLAMABAD, No BoMiBs IN SouTm ASIA,
REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE, May 1987. Until India signs the NPT, however, Pakistan will
remain uncommitted to its principles as well. Jones, Nuclear Supply Policy and South
Asia, NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS AND NONPROLIFERATION, 172 (Jones ed. 1985). Pakistan
exemplifies the intrinsic problems of a comprehensive nonproliferation strategy while it
remains outside international controls. Carrot and Stick Policy, supra note 3, at 18.
But see Rais, Pakistan's Nuclear Program Prospects for Proliferation, 25 ASIAN
SURV. 458, 458 (1985) (stating that the contemporary nonproliferation efforts present
a number of serious technological, economic, political, and strategic restraints limiting
Pakistan's option to acquire nuclear weapons).
11. Note, The Proliferation of Nuclear Reactors, 20 J. WORLD TRADE L. 99, 105
(1986). With Libyan money purchased on the gray market and through dummy com-
panies set up in Western countries, Pakistan has bought equipment for its uranium
enrichment plant. Id.; see also Khalilizad, Pakistan and the Bomb, 36 BULL. ATo,.
Sci. 11, 13 (1980) (discussing the secret attempt of Pakistan to acquire a uranium
enrichment plant to process weapon-quality material).
12. See infra notes 149-56 and accompanying text (discussing the warmer United
States-Pakistan relations since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979).
1989]
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Unfortunately, the Reagan administration did not place much empha-
sis on reducing the incentive for Pakistan to develop nuclear weapons.
For example, the administration failed to exercise any economic lever-
age over Pakistan prior to approving its aid packages to that country."3
In so doing, the United States failed to extract important concessions
that could have significantly reduced the ability of Pakistan to develop
its own nuclear arsenal."" Throughout the Reagan administration, other
foreign policy objectives have taken priority over the effort to limit the
prospects for proliferation in South Asia. 5
A stronger United States commitment to nonproliferation objectives
is crucial. The recent attempt of Pakistan to illegally acquire nuclear
materials within the United States, in direct violation of United States
nonproliferation laws, 16 raised serious concerns over the future direc-
tion of the nuclear program in Pakistan. Due to heightened suspicion of
Pakistani attempts to develop a nuclear weapon, the United States has
considered punitive action, in particular the elimination of United
States economic and military aid to Pakistan. 7
This Comment examines why the United States nonproliferation pol-
icy fails to establish an effective strategy for dealing with potential
proliferants. Part I of this Comment traces the history of nuclear non-
proliferation policies in the international arena, in the United States,
and in Pakistan. Part II examines the Reagan administration non-
13. Cross & Smith, The Reagan Administration's Nonproliferation Nonpolicy 33
CATH. U.L. REV. 633, 657 (1984). The Reagan administration claims that expanded
aid has given increased influence over the nuclear program in Pakistan. Id. Using aid
as a lever implies a willingness on the part of the United States to withdraw assistance
to enforce its nonproliferation objectives. Id. This willingness, however, is missing in
Reagan's administration. Id.
14. Id. at 659.
15. Id. at 657. Under this administration, nonproliferation objectives are
superceded by concerns regarding the perceived Soviet threat in South Asia. See infra
notes 148-54 and accompanying text (discussing how the Soviet invasion of Afghani-
stan in 1979 changed United States foreign policy objectives in South Asia).
16. Rosenfeld, Pakistan's Nuclear Insurance, Wash. Post, July 31, 1987 at A23
[hereinafter Pakistan's Nuclear Insurance]; Oberdorfer, U.S. Asks Pakistan to Stop
Producing Bomb-Grade Uranium, Wash. Post, July 23, 1987 at A37 [hereinafter U.S.
Asks Pakistan to Stop Producing]; Weintraub, Pakistan Faces Woes From Within,
Without, Wash. Post, July 23, 1987 at AI0 [hereinafter Pakistan Faces Woes]. Be-
cause of recent allegations that Pakistan was involved in an attempt to acquire nuclear-
related material from the United States, the Reagan administration has told Pakistan
that it must act to avoid an aid cutoff. Oberdorfer, U.S. Says Pakistan Must Act to
Avoid Aid Cutoff Over Nuclear-Export Case, Wash. Post, July 17, 1987 at A22 [here-
inafter Pakistan Must Act]. See infra notes 162-68 and accompanying text (discussing
the recent arrest of Arshad A. Pervez and its impact on United States-Pakistan diplo-
matic relations).
17. Shipler, U.S. Presses Pakistan on Atom Plants, N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1987 at
A15; Pakistan Must Act, supra note 16, at A22.
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proliferation strategy toward Pakistan. This section analyzes United
States-Pakistan tensions and evaluates whether the United States
should invoke punitive sanctions against Pakistan. Part III proposes a
solution to the tensions and examines long-term prospects for halting a
nuclear arms race in South Asia.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT
The history of legal nonproliferation efforts is comprised of three dis-
tinct phases. The first phase, or the period of secrecy, began with the
close of the Second World War.18 The second phase, the "Atoms for
Peace" era, occurred during the Eisenhower administration."9 The third
phase, the era of containment, which followed the signing of the Nu-
clear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968, characterizes United
States nonproliferation policy today.20
1. The Period of Secrecy
The first efforts to contain nuclear proliferation took place immedi-
ately following the end of World War 11.21 During this period, which
lasted until 1954, the United States struggled to maintain its monopoly
over nuclear technology and instituted a foreign relations policy that
sought to deny other nations access to nuclear technology.2 The United
States promulgated proposals for international supervision of nuclear
activities and materials in order to control proliferation.23 The Soviet
18. See infra notes 21-26 and accompanying text (discussing the period of secrecy).
19. See infra notes 27-35 and accompanying text (describing the "Atoms for
Peace" era).
20. See infra notes 36-60 and accompanying text (discussing current trends in
United States nonproliferation policy).
21. Ausness, supra note 5, at 66; Edwards, International Legal Aspects of Safe-
guards and the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 33 INT'L & Co.sp. L. Q. 1, 2
(1984); Firmage, Anarchy or Order? The Nth Country Problem and the International
Rule of Law, 29 Mo. L. REv. 138, 142-44 (1964).
22. Ausness, supra note 5, at 66; R. BECKMAN, NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION,
13-49 (1985); Scheinman, supra note 1, at 355. Nuclear weapons has preoccupied
United States security and foreign policy matters since the advent of nuclear arms. Id.
23. Edwards, supra note 21, at 2. In both the Acheson-Lilienthal Report of 1945
and the Baruch Plan of 1946, the United States advocated international control of
nuclear materials. REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF AToMIc ENERGY,
U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT PUBLICATION 2498, Mar. 1946. Carrot and Stick Policy,
supra note 3, at 29. The Acheson-Lilienthal Report of 1946 was co-authored by Secre-
tary of State Dean Acheson and Tennessee Valley Authority Chairman David Lilien-
thai. Id. The plan proposed to implement extensive international controls over all nu-
clear materials to ensure the development of peaceful nuclear programs. Id.
Accordingly, it advocated the establishment of an international supervisory organiza-
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Union together with other nations, however, rejected these proposals. 2'
Their rejection led the United States to adopt strict controls over its
nuclear materials, including a prohibition on the exchange of scientific
nuclear technology, that was enunciated in the Atomic Energy Act of
1946.25 In spite of the Act, United States efforts to exercise strict con-
trol of the export of nuclear technology did not prevent other nations
from acquiring nuclear weapons capability.2 6
2. The "Atoms for Peace" Era
In 1953, President Eisenhower inaugurated the most significant era
in international and United States nuclear containment policy with his
famous "Atoms for Peace" speech before the United Nations General
Assembly. 7 Eisenhower's speech outlined a new approach to prolifera-
tion and proposed that nuclear states share the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy with non-nuclear states.28 Under this plan, the United States
tion. Id. J. YAGER, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN NUCLEAR ENERGY, 146-48
(1981) [hereinafter Improving Int'l Nuclear Regime).
The Plan was motivated by a desire to eliminate competition among states develop-
ing nuclear weapons. Cross & Smith, supra note 13, at 635. The plan called for coop-
erative international development of nuclear energy. Under this plan, all phases of de-
veloping and using nuclear energy would be supervised by a United Nations
commission. Edwards, supra note 21, at 3.
24. Cross & Smith, supra note 13, at 635. Mutual feelings of secrecy and suspicion
developed in the international community, which were brought on by United States
efforts to hold on to its short-lived monopoly. Carrot and Stick Policy, supra note 3, at
29; see also Nuclear Proliferation: Future U.S. Foreign Policy Implications: Hearings
before the Subcomm. on International Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 244 (1975)
(statement of Myron B. Kratzer).
25. The Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-585, 60 Stat. 755 (1946); The
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2011-2096 (1976). The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 prohibited the United States
from shipping weapons-quality materials and prohibited the United States from ex-
changing scientific nuclear technology to other nations. Comment, United States Con-
trols Over Exports of Weapons-Grade Uranium, 23 B.U. INT'L L. J. 449, 454 (1984)
[hereinafter United States Controls]. The act was premised on the belief that the pre-
vention of nuclear cooperation would prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Id. at 455;
BRENNER, NUCLEAR POWER AND NON-PROLIFERATION 2 (1981). See also BECKMAN,
supra note 22, at 37 (stating that the Act did not deal with difficult issues of interna-
tional control because the United States anticipated the passage of an international
regulatory scheme).
26. Ausness, supra note 5, at 66; Cross & Smith, supra note 13, at 635. United
States controls did not prevent the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France from rap-
idly developing nuclear capability. Id.
27. "Atoms For Peace Speech," 8 U.N. GAOR (470th Mtg.) at 79-126, U.N. Doc.
A/PV.470, (Dec. 8, 1953). See Yeager, Improving Int'l Regime, supra note 23, at 149
(stating that this speech marked the beginning of a fundamental shift in United States
foreign policy).
28. Cross & Smith, supra note 13, at 635. Under this plan, the United States
would assist non-nuclear states in developing peaceful nuclear programs. Id. The
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would end the policy of secrecy and restraint mandated in the Atomic
Energy Act of 1946.29
This new policy of the United States initiated the era of international
cooperation."0 Pursuant to the "Atoms for Peace" plan, the United
States enacted the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,31 helped establish the
International Atomic Energy Act (IAEA),32 and entered into numerous
speech also proposed that an International Atomic Energy Agency be established to
encourage the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to play an instrumental role in con-
trolling the transfers of nuclear materials. Edwards, supra note 21, at 3. But cf.
Bauser, United States Nuclear Export Policy: Developing the Peaceful Atom as a
Commodity in International Trade, 18 HARV. INT'L L. J. 227, 228 n.3 (1977) (stating
that the United States did not take the lead in the development and export of nuclear
power facilities to non-nuclear states, as is commonly believed). The British sold the
first two nuclear power reactors in international commerce to Japan and Italy. Id.
29. Cross & Smith, supra note 13, at 635; Yeager, Improving Int'l Regime, supra
note 23, at 149; see also THE HARVARD STUDY GROUP, LIVING WITh NUCLEAR
WEAPONS 225 (1983) [hereinafter THE HARVARD STUDY GROUP] (stating that Presi-
dent Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" plan pledged United States nuclear technological
assistance to those nations which promised, in return, not to use the assistance for
military purposes).
30. Cross & Smith, supra note 13, at 635.
31. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § § 2011-2296 (1982). The Atomic
Energy Act stated that the basic policy of the United States was to encourage coopera-
tion between the United States and other nations trying to develop nuclear energy. Id.
§ 2011. The AEA also established conditions for nuclear cooperation regarding the
transport of nuclear equipment and materials. Krauland, NEPA. Nukes and Non-
Proliferation: Clarifying the Transnational Impact Statement Mandate in Nuclear
Export Licensing, 4 HASTINGS INT'L & CohiP. L. REV. 201, 208 (1981). Under the
Act, nuclear trade is permissible after the United States and the importing nations
executed an agreement for cooperation. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2153
(1982); United States Controls, supra note 25, at 455. The agreements for cooperation
include the following specific guidelines: (1) the terms, conditions, scope, and duration
of the agreement; (2) agreement of the recipient party security safeguards as set forth
in the guidelines; (3) the agreement of the recipient party to the prohibited use of the
materials for atomic weapons; and (4) the capitulation of the recipient not to transfer
the materials to unauthorized persons. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2153
(1982).
32. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, supra note 1. The chief
goals of the IAEA were to promote development of civilian nuclear energy and to es-
tablish international safeguards against the potential misuse of nuclear technology for
military purposes. Edwards, supra note 21, at 3. Under the statute, the important func-
tions of the IAEA with regard to nuclear activities are (1) to encourage and assist, and
perhaps carry out research; (2) to receive and provide materials, services, equipment,
and facilities; (3) to encourage the interchange of scientific and technical expertise; (4)
to encourage the exchange and training of scientific experts; (5) to develop and apply
safeguards to prevent diversion to military use of nuclear items furnished for or
pledged to peaceful purposes; and (6) to establish, ratify, and apply health and safety
standards and measures. Statute of the International Atomic Agency, supra note 1, at
art. III; P. SzAsz, THE LAW AND PRACTICES OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY
AGENCY 351 (1970). From its inception, the IAEA has served as a diplomatic channel
for nations attempting to formulate agreements committed to maintaining peaceful nu-
clear programs. Note, Protecting Nuclear Materials in the Terrorist Age: The Interna-
tional Challenge, 12 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 307, 319 (1986) [hereinafter Protecting
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bilateral agreements for cooperation. 3 This new attitude toward nu-
clear energy was premised on the general belief that exchanging the
peaceful benefits of the atom would prevent non-nuclear states from
establishing independent nuclear programs." In the 1950s, an interna-
tional regulatory system emerged that instituted rules and procedures
designed to handle a potentially dangerous novel energy source.35
3. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and Its Implications for
Non-Proliferation
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),36 signed in 1968, is
the primary international agreement for the prevention of the spread of
nuclear weapons.37 Under the terms of this multilateral treaty, the con-
Nuclear Materials].
33. Cross & Smith, supra note 13, at 635; Yager, Improving Int7 Regime, supra
note 23, at 150. As early as 1955, the United States had executed bilateral agreements
with 27 countries. Id. A common aspect of all early agreements on international nu-
clear cooperation was promises against the transfer of nuclear materials to third par-
ties. Id.
34. Smith, Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament, 4 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L &
CoMp. L. 345, 347 (1983); see Protecting Nuclear Materials, supra note 32, at 317-18
(stating that the NPT has checked non-nuclear weapon states from independently de-
veloping nuclear weaponry); Carrot and Stick Policy, supra note 3, at 30 (asserting
that sharing nuclear technology removes incentives for non-nuclear states to develop
nuclear programs); Nuclear Proliferation Hearings, supra note 24, at 244 (stating that
through the new policy, non-nuclear states could benefit from atomic power without
establishing their own nuclear programs, which might lead to the development of nu-
clear weapons), see also THE HARVARD STUDY GROUP, supra note 29, at 226-27 (dis-
cussing the NPT as central to modern-day nonproliferation efforts).
35. Scheinman, supra note 1, at 357-58. In this era, three basic beliefs were
formed: (1) that nuclear proliferation was not beneficial for every state and rather than
enhancing security, the acquisition of nuclear weapons could possibly reduce security
and increase instability; (2) that nuclear energy has an important part to play in, and
can make a significant contribution to, national energy development; (3) that the devel-
opment of an international system designed to establish appropriate terms and condi-
tions for cooperation can alleviate identifiable risks associated with the spread of nu-
clear technology; and (4) that this international system will facilitate the widespread
access to nuclear energy without substantially increasing the risk of nuclear weapons
proliferation. Id. at 358.
36. NPT, supra note 1. A majority of Western, Socialist, and developing countries
have signed the Treaty, including Afghanistan, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia,
Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Den-
mark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, German Demo-
cratic Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, Morocco, The Netherlands, New Zea-
land, Nicaragua, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Romania, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sweden,
Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States, Vene-
zuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, and Taiwan; see UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DIs-
ARMAMENT AGENCY, ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS 96-98 (1984)
[hereinafter ARMS CONTROL] (listing the signatory nations).
37. Ausness, supra note 5, at 87. See Carrot and Stick Policy, supra note 3, at 33
(stating that the NPT dramatically curtailed nuclear proliferation); Protecting Nuclear
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tracting parties agree to cooperate in facilitating the fullest possible
exchange of nuclear technological information for the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy 8 and to control the spread of nuclear weapons.3 9 The
NPT is widely accepted, and it is therefore an important step toward
regulating the development of peaceful nuclear programs around the
world.40
The NPT attempts to minimize the risks of a dangerous interna-
tional nuclear arms race through various measures."1 For example, the
NPT prohibits the transfer of nuclear technology, equipment, or nu-
clear material (such as uranium or plutonium) to any non-nuclear
weapon 42 nation without international safeguards. 3 These safeguards
Materials, supra note 32, at 317 (discussing how the NPT hindered both the growth of
nuclear weaponry and the acquisition of nuclear materials). The impetus behind the
NPT was the hope that an international agreement on nonproliferation would reduce
international tensions and thus prevent a dangerous multilateral nuclear arms race.
Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation, supra note 6, at 159-60.
38. NPT, supra note 1, art. IV § 2. Article IV, section 2 states:
All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to par-
ticipate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific
and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to
the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or
together with other States or international organizations to the further develop-
ment of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in
the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due con-
sideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.
Id.
39. NPT, supra note 1, art. I and II. Articles I and II contain the basic provisions
prohibiting the spread of nuclear weapons. Id. Article I directly defines the obligations
of a nuclear-weapon state party to the Treaty. Id. art. I. Article I states:
Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the treaty undertakes not to transfer to any
recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or con-
trol over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any
way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufac-
ture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or
control over such weapons or explosive devices.
Id. Article II outlines the obligations of a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the treaty.
Id. art. II. Article II states:
Each non-nuclear weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the
transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear ex-
plosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or
indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nu-
clear explosive devices, and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufac-
ture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
Id. Nuclear-weapon states which are not parties to the Treaty, however, can transfer
nuclear weapons to other nations. Ausness, supra note 5, at 88 n. 147.
40. Carrot and Stick Policy, supra note 3, at 32-33. By 1984, 97 countries had
signed the NPT; see ARNIS CONTROL, supra note 36, at 96-98 (listing countries that
have signed the NPT).
41. Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation, supra note 6, at 159-60.
42. See id. at 160 n.4 (explaining that the NPT does not define a nuclear weapon
nation or a non-nuclear weapon nation). A nuclear-weapon nation is one which either
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are designed to prevent the transfer of nuclear technology or material
to nations intending to divert assistance to nonpeaceful uses." In a fur-
ther attempt to control proliferation, the Treaty requires each non-nu-
clear weapon state to accept international safeguards on all its peaceful
nuclear facilities. 5
In addition, under the NPT, nuclear weapon states are encouraged to
make available, under appropriate international procedures, peaceful
nuclear explosives to non-nuclear weapon states on a nondiscriminatory
basis.4" Nuclear weapon states are also directed to pursue measures in
possesses nuclear weapons or a nuclear explosion capability (or both), and a non-nu-
clear weapon nation possesses neither. Id.
43. NPT, supra note 1, art. III § (2). Article III, section 2 states:
Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to provide: (a) source of special
fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared
for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any non-
nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fission-
able material shall be subject to the safeguards required by this Article.
Id.
44. Edwards, supra note 21, at 10; see Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation, supra
note 6, at 160 (outlining the goals of the NPT); But see W. PATTERSON, THE PLUTO-
NIUM BUSINESS AND THE SPREAD OF THE BOMB, 35-36 (1984) [hereinafter THE PLUTO-
NIUM BUSINESS] (stating that because the NPT gave non-signatory states a competitive
advantage in the nuclear materials market, signatory states ignore the safeguard re-
quirements promulgated for the sale of nuclear materials).
45. NPT, supra note 1, art. III § (1). Article III section I states:
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes to accept safe-
guards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the
International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguard system, for the
exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed
under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from
peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures
for the safeguards required by this article shall be followed with respect to source
or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in
any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards re-
quired by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material
in all peaceful nuclear facilities within the territory of such state, under its juris-
diction, or carried out under its control anywhere.
Id.
46. NPT, supra note 1, art. V. Article V states:
Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to ensure
that, in accordance with this Treaty, under appropriate international observation
and through appropriate international procedures, potential benefits from any
peaceful applications of nuclear explosions will be made available to non-nuclear
weapon states Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the
charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used will be as low as possible
and exclude any charge for research and development. Non-nuclear-weapon
States Party to the treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits pursuant to a
special international agreement or agreements, through an appropriate interna-
tional body with adequate representation of non-nuclear weapon states. Negotia-
tions on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters
into force. Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring may also
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good faith that are aimed at reducing their own nuclear arsenal.' 7 In
sum, the Treaty encourages the development of peaceful nuclear en-
ergy, and, simultaneously, tries to establish strict control over nuclear
weapon proliferation.48
Many problems, however, hinder the application of the NPT. The
NPT contains several loopholes through which a non-nuclear party to
the NPT can acquire the technology and materials necessary to develop
nuclear weapons.' 9 For example, under the Treaty, non-nuclear states
can acquire nuclear facilities for peaceful purposes that are not ex-
pressly specified in the Treaty. 0 While the Treaty governs the transfer
of nuclear technology, it does not cover the subsequent development of
that nuclear technology.5"
In addition, the refusal of several important nations to sign the NPT
reduces its effectiveness.52 In many ways, the Treaty is considered po-
litically unacceptable to these countries, that regard its intent as both
obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreements.
Id.
47. NPT, supra note I, art. VI. Article VI states:
"Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good
faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an
early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and compete
disarmament under strict and effective international control."
Id.
48. Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation, supra note 6, at 162; Ausness, supra note
5, at 87-90. The NPT attempts to balance the concerns of the nuclear states over the
spread of nuclear weapons and the political, military, and economic concerns of the
non-nuclear nations. Id. at 87.
49. Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation, supra note 6, at 163-64.
50. Carrot and Stick Policy, supra note 3, at 33; Bettauer, The Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Act of 1978, 10 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1103, 1137 (1978). The chief
example of illegal applications is the conversion of nuclear materials for military pur-
poses. Id.; see also Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation, supra note 6, at 163 (stating
that purchased nuclear facilities can be studied and replicated). Brazil, a non-party
nation, purchased the technology for a complete nuclear cycle from the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany. Id. at 163 n.20. This technology provides an ideal teaching tool for the
nuclear program in Brazil. Id.
51. Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation, supra note 6, at 164. The NPT does not
prevent non-signatory states from pursuing independent, indigenous nuclear programs.
Carrot and Stick Policy, supra note 3, at 33.
52. Ausness, supra note 5, at 90; Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation, supra note
6, at 166. Important countries that have refused to sign or ratify the NPT include:
Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Chile, China, Cuba, Guinea, France, Guyana, India, Israel,
North Korea, Monaco, Niger, Pakistan, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Spain, South Africa,
Tanzania, Turkey, and Zambia. L. SPECTOR, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION TODAY 441
(1984) [hereinafter SPECTOR TODAY]. The United States has nuclear agreements with
several nations that are not parties to the NPT even though these nations may choose
to ignore international safeguards. Id. Currently, the United States has agreements for
peaceful nuclear cooperation with Argentina, Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Africa,
Spain, and Turkey. Bettauer, supra note 50, at 1137. These states have not signed the
NPT. Id.
1989]
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
discriminatory and perpetuating nuclear monopoly.3 Most of these
non-party states are located in unstable regions where severe security
problems exist. 4 Security pressures provide the major impetus behind
decisions to acquire nuclear weapons capability. 5  Because the Treaty
cannot provide security guarantees to non-nuclear states,56 many high
risk nations elect to retain their nuclear option.5 1
In spite of these limitations, however, the Treaty establishes some
important international norms of behavior in the nuclear field.58 The
goal of nonproliferation enunciated in the Treaty should extend to all
53. Silverstein, Sharing United States Energy and Technology with Less-Devel-
oped Countries: A Model for International Technology Transfer, 12 J. INT'L L. &
ECON. 363, 378 (1978); Ausness, supra note 5, at 90. For example, while the NPT
permits nuclear states to have nuclear weapons, non-nuclear states must forego nuclear
weapons completely. Id. In addition, nuclear states have no obligation to submit to the
international safeguards to which non-nuclear states must submit. Id. The Soviet Union
is an example of a nuclear-weapon state that refuses to permit IAEA inspections of its
civilian nuclear facilities. Id. at 90 n.165.
54. Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation, supra note 6, at 166. Among these re-
gional rival pairs are countries such as Israel and Egypt, India and Pakistan, Brazil,
and Argentina. Id.
55. Id. at 166; see supra note 6 and accompanying text (explaining that a nation
concerned with its security may seek to acquire nuclear weapons).
56. Ausness, supra note 5, at 90; Ehrlich, The Nonproliferation Treaty and Peace-
ful Uses of Nuclear Explosives, 96 VA. L. REV. 587, 600 (1970). The United States
objected to incorporating security guarantees in the NPT. Comment, Legal Implica-
tions of Indian Nuclear Development, 4 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 237, 250 (1974).
The United Nations Security Council, however, has adopted a resolution on "security
assurances" intended to protect non-nuclear weapon parties from acts or threats of
aggression with nuclear weapons. Ausness, supra note 5, at 90. The United States,
Great Britain, and the Soviet Union have pledged to provide immediate assistance to
any country attacked by a nuclear weapon. Id.
57. Ausness, supra note 5, at 90. From a security standpoint, to increase the pros-
pects for nonproliferation, short-term security assurances and long-term substantive
changes must be made to non-nuclear states to help eliminate the perceived threat of
nuclear attack. See Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation, supra note 6, at 170-75 (dis-
cussing ways to reduce the perceived threat of nuclear attack).
From a political standpoint, reducing the discrimination against non-nuclear nations
caused by the NPT can diminish the value of nuclear weapons. Id. at 176-77. The
discrimination in NPT obligations and in nuclear opportunities must be reduced. Id.
The discriminatory nature of the NPT also extends to future economic benefits. Id.
at 178. Among the most popular measures suggested to reduce the economic pressures
for nuclear proliferation are: (1) to form a comprehensive nuclear technology and ma-
terial suppliers cartel; and (2) to provide the preferential treatment to non-nuclear
NPT-party nations promised by nuclear nations. Id. at 180.
58. TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, ARMS CONTROL
AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS 88-89 (1982 ed.). Since the implementation of the
Treaty: (1) no nuclear weapon state party to the Treaty has transferred nuclear weap-
ons to any non-nuclear weapon state; (2) no non-nuclear weapon state party to the
Treaty has acquired a nuclear weapon; (3) the IAEA has developed an extensive sys-
tem of safeguards; (4) safeguard agreements have entered, pursuant to the terms of the
NPT, into force in over 60 countries. Id.
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nuclear activity.59 Unfortunately, under international law, non-aligned
nations are not compelled to comply with the terms of the Treaty. 60
Their non-compliance impairs the overall effectiveness of the Treaty
and weakens international response to proliferation.
4. The Current Era of Containment
In the 1970s, concern over the adequacy of international nonprolifer-
ation measures emerged.61 In 1974, India detonated a nuclear explo-
sive.62 This dramatic event affected the outlook of the entire interna-
tional nonproliferation community.
India, a non-aligned party to the NPT, was the first country to
detonate a "peaceful" nuclear bomb from materials and technology im-
ported from the West. 3 India's use of nuclear technology in this fash-
ion was viewed as inconsistent with the main objectives of the NPT,6
59. Carrot and Stick Policy, supra note 3, at 35; Gilinsky, Nuclear Energy and the
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in NUCLEAR PouciEs: FUEL WITHOUT THE BOMB
89 (R. Bacher ed. 1978).
60. J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 49-56 (H. Walcock, 6th ed. 1963). A new
law cannot bind a state without its consent. Id. International law is the sum of rules to
which states have bound themselves. Id. No international body, therefore, can compel
nations to sign international multilateral treaties. Carrot and Stick Policy, supra note
3, at 39.
61. 34 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 350 (1978) [hereinafter CONG. Q. ALMANAC, 1978].
In part, the concerns of the international community in the 1970s may be attributed to:
(I) the oil crisis in 1973-1974 demonstrated that countries could not rely on foreign
sources of energy and thus, encouraged countries to become self-sufficient; (2) the
emergence of ambitious regional powers that resisted the control of the nuclear powers;
and (3) the emergence of sophisticated terrorist groups that threatened to exploit the
weaknesses of nuclear regulations. Id. at 351; see Scheinman, supra note 1, at 360
(stating that the projected transfer of nuclear technology and facilities to nations with
incipient nuclear programs such as Taiwan and Pakistan also engendered concern
about the adequacy of the nonproliferation regime).
62. Betts, India, Pakistan and Iran, in NON-PROUIFERATION AND U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY 85 (J. Yager ed. 1980); CONG. Q. ALtANAC, 1978, supra note 61, at 350.
India was the first nation to detonate an atomic bomb from materials imported for
peaceful nuclear purposes, and the sixth nation to explode a nuclear device. Milhollin,
Dateline New Delhi: India's Nuclear Cover-Up, 64 FOREIGN POL'Y 161, 161 (1986).
63. Recent Development, Nuclear Non-Proliferation. Export of Nuclear Fuel to
India 22 HARV. INT'L L. J. 227, 232 (1981). Canada supplied the nuclear reactor used
to develop the Indian bomb. The United States provided the heavy water needed to run
the reactor. Id.; Milhollin, supra note 62, at 161.
64. Carrot and Stick Policy, supra note 3, at 34. The main objectives of the NPT
are to contain the spread of nuclear weapons and to promote the peaceful use of nu-
clear energy. SPECTOR, TODAY, supra note 52, at 34-35. It is debatable whether a
nuclear explosion is peaceful. Id. Although the Indian detonation was inconsistent with
United States nonproliferation goals, the Nixon administration did not impose any
sanctions. Moeller, supra note 63, at 232. Canada, however, in response, terminated all
nuclear assistance to India. Id.; see Rao, Proliferation and the Indian Test: A View
from India, 16 SURVIVAL 210, 210-212 (1974) (describing the effect of the peaceful
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yet the nuclear states were powerless to prevent its occurrence.6 5 After
the explosion, treaty members undertook a major re-examination of nu-
clear nonproliferation strategy.
66
Immediately following the Indian explosion, the London nuclear sup-
pliers group, comprised of many Eastern and Western industrial na-
tions, 67 met secretly to address the need for concerted international ac-
tion regarding the export of nuclear material and technology. 8
Concluding the need for more extensive controls, the London nuclear
suppliers group formulated certain guidelines.69 These guidelines were
intended to supplement the perceived inadequacies of the NPT. 0 They
endorsed multinational controls over enrichment and reprocessing71 fa-
nuclear explosion in India on other nations); cf., Dougherty, Nuclear Proliferation In
Asia, 19 ORBIS 925, 932-39 (1975) (describing the reaction of other nations to the
peaceful nuclear explosion in India).
65. CONG. Q. ALMANAC, 1978, supra note 61, at 350. The Indian explosion demon-
strated that nations could develop the bomb without detection from outside states. Id.
This precluded other nations from trying diplomatically to deter the development of an
explosive. Id.
66. See Scheinman, supra note 1, at 360 (stating that the explosion demonstrated
to the nuclear powers that the international nonproliferation community could not con-
tain the spread of nuclear weapons).
67. United States Controls, supra note 25, at 457. The nuclear suppliers group
included: Belgium, Great Britain, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, East Germany,
West Germany, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, the
United States, and the Soviet Union. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. OF THE SEN. COMM. ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 97TH CONG., 2D SESs., EUROPEAN REACTIONS TO THE IN-
TERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE EVALUATION (INFCE) 13 (Comm. Print 1982).
68. United States Controls, supra note 25, at 458.
69. IAEA, Communications Received from Certain Member States Regarding
Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment, or Technology, IAEA Doc.
No. INFCIRC/254 (1978), reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 220, 225 app. (1978) [hereinafter
Guidelines]. The United States, the Soviet Union, Australia, Denmark, Canada, Fin-
land, Norway, the United Kingdom, The Netherlands, West Germany, Poland, East
Germany, and Hungary were the original parties to the Guidelines. Coleman, Interna-
tional Safeguards Against Non-Government Nuclear Theft: A Study of Legal Inade-
quacies, 10 INT'L LAW., 493, 513 (1976). In 1976, Japan and France joined the guide-
lines. Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation, supra note 6, at 182.
70. Yager, Incentives and Capabilities, supra note 3, at 415. Tighter controls make
it more difficult but do not create an impenetrable barrier to building nuclear weapon
facilities in non-weapon states. Id. The Guidelines are an attempt to fill the gaps in the
incomplete coverage of the NPT. Id.; see Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation, supra
note 6, at 188-90 (explaining that nuclear source material such as uranium and pluto-
nium exist in certain non-NPT nations and thus negates the effectiveness of the NPT
and the Guidelines by providing alternative sources of supply).
71. Guidelines, supra note 69, at 226, guideline 7. Enrichment and reprocessing are
two crucial phases of the nuclear cycle. See Ausness, supra note 5, at 72-87 (describ-
ing, in detail, the enrichment and reprocessing phases of the nuclear cycle and the
methods used to produce weapons-grade material). Each state had the potential for
providing material suitable for the production of nuclear weapons. Id. at 72. The ura-
nium and plutonium routes are the two ways to develop weapons-grade material. Id. at
73. The enrichment phase of the nuclear fuel cycle is the critical step in the uranium
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cilities, and required suppliers to exercise more restraint when provid-
ing nuclear assistance and materials.2 Because these guidelines and
other international efforts to control nuclear materials7 3 are not yet
widely adopted, they have failed to establish international norms of
behavior.
Many countries resent the guidelines74 and sidestep them to acquire
nuclear weapon capability.7 5 The effectiveness of these international
route. Id. Alternatively, the reprocessing phase is the critical step in the development of
weapons-grade material in the plutonium route. Id.
72. Yager, Incentives and Capabilities, supra note 3, at 414. The Guidelines re-
quire that: (1) suppliers obtain formal assurances from a recipient state that the state
would not use imported nuclear technology to produce a nuclear device; (2) recipients
satisfy specified levels of physical protection for nuclear material and equipment; (3)
recipients apply IAEA safeguards to all imported material and equipment; (4) recipi-
ents agree to retransfer nuclear material derived from imported facilities to another
country only after obtaining the same assurances as required by the original supplier,
and (5) suppliers consult each other when a violation occurs; for example, when a re-
cipient detonates a nuclear device or illegally terminates or violates an IAEA safeguard
agreement. Ausness, supra note 5, at 94-95. The Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers are
located in COMMUNICATIONs RECEIVED FROM CERTAIN MEMBER STATES REGARDING
GUIDELINES FOR THE EXPORT OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT OR TECHNOLOGY
app. IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/254, reprinted in IAEA INFORMATION CIRCULAR, (Feb.
1978).
73. See International Atomic Energy Agency Convention on the Physical Protec-
tion of Nuclear Material, IAEA Document No. INFCIRC/274/rev. 1, May 1980 re-
printed in 18 I.L.M. 1419 (1972) (describing an international agreement aimed at con-
trolling nuclear materials) [hereinafter Physical Protection Convention]. In 1974,
United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger proposed the Convention to the
United Nations General Assembly. Implementing the Convention for the Physical Pro-
tection of Nuclear Material-Report to Accompany H.R. Rule No. 5228, H.R. REP'.
No. 624, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIUN. Nvs
3229, 3229. The most important articles of the Convention set forth that: (1) states
that are parties to the Treaty will take appropriate domestic steps to ensure the safe
transport of nuclear material; (2) states that are parties to the Treaty are obligated to
obtain formal assurances that recipient countries who receive nuclear materials will
observe the prescribed standards; and (3) states that are parties to the Treaty agree to
exchange information relating to unauthorized removal, use, or alteration of nuclear
material. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material-Report to Ac-
company Ex. H.R. REP. No. 96-2, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. S. REP. No. 181, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws, 1663-66. The
Treaty, however, has not been ratified by the 21 states requisite for entry into force.
Protecting Nuclear Materials, supra note 32, at 308.
74. Ausness, supra note 5, at 95. The exclusive nuclear suppliers group formed, in
secret, the Guidelines and unilaterally imposed the Guidelines on the rest of the world.
Id. The nuclear supplier cartel intended to keep less developed countries dependent on
its nuclear assistance through the restriction of the flow of nuclear technology and
materials. Id. This, however, increased the tensions between the nuclear states and the
non-nuclear states. Id; see also G. ROCHLIN, PLUTONIUM, POWER AND POLITICS 163
(1979) (stating that the nuclear suppliers group meetings were held in secret and the
original membership was not revealed initially).
75. Yager, Incentives and Capabilities, supra note 3, at 415. Countries that desire
to do so can acquire nuclear materials. Id. For example, countries like Pakistan often
choose to .circumvent controls over the export of sensitive nuclear material technology
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nonproliferation measures is therefore suspect. In part, the problem re-
volves around the enforcement of international regulations because
many supplier nations simply choose to ignore the regulations when
faced with the prospect of making a profit in the lucrative nuclear tech-
nology market."6 Without the cooperation of individual nuclear supplier
nations, tighter multilateral control will fail."
B. UNITED STATES NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION POLICY
All nuclear supplier states, including the United States, have enacted
domestic legislation to establish procedures to conduct international nu-
clear business. 78 The provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act
of 1978 (NNPA)7 1 form the focus of the modern legal statutory frame-
work for United States nonproliferation policy. The NNPA updated,
amended, and tightened the export control criteria established under
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.8o
Under the NNPA, the majority of President Carter's nonprolifera-
to acquire the necessary assistance. Id. Other countries, for example, India, rely on
their own ability to develop a nuclear explosive device. Id.
76. Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation, supra note 6, at 183. See Note, The
Proliferation of Nuclear Reactors, 20 J. WORLD TRADE L. 99, 109 (1986) (stating
that nuclear trade is a billion dollar business that is legal under article IV of the NPT).
The Guidelines require suppliers to obtain formal assurances from a recipient nation
that it will not use imported nuclear assistance to produce a nuclear weapon. Guide-
lines, supra note 69. The Guidelines, however, are not legally binding. Yager, Incen-
tives and Capabilities, supra note 3, at 414; Edwards, supra note 21, at 16.
77. Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation, supra note 6, at 181; Bettauer, supra note
50, at 1109-10.
78. Stoiber, supra note 2, at 369.
79. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 85-242, 92 Stat. 120, 22
U.S.C.A. § § 3201-82, 42 U.S.C. § § 2011-2160a (1982) [hereinafter NNPA]. The
NNPA was enacted after months of Congressional hearings and debate over the proper
role of the United States as a nuclear exporter. United States Controls, supra note 25,
at 458. For a list of Senate and House hearings on the NNPA, see Bettauer, supra
note 50, at 1106 n.5. See Krauland, supra note 31, at 237-73 (describing the structure
of the NNPA). For a legislative history of the Act, see generally Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Act of 1977: Hearings on S. 897 and S. 1432 Before the Subcomm. on
Energy Research and Development of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Re-
sources, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1978); The Nuclear Antiproliferation Act of 1977:
Hearings on H.R. 8638 Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Security and Scientific Affairs
and the Subcomm. on Int'l Economic Policy Trade of the House Comm. on Intl Rela-
tions, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1977: Hearings
on S. 897 Before the Subcomm. on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation, and Federal Ser-
vices of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977);
Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Controls: Hearing on S. 897 and S. 1432 Before the
Subcomm. on Arms Control, Oceans, and Int'l Environment of the Senate Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
80. 42 U.S.C. § § 2011-2296 (1982). See Carrot and Stick Policy, supra note 3, at
35; United States Controls, supra note 25, at 459.
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tion policies were enacted into law.81 President Carter was committed
to the objectives of nonproliferation. a2 He was successful in limiting
nuclear exports by pressuring foreign suppliers to restrict their sensitive
nuclear exports.8 3 He also committed United States resources to ensure
the growth of international safeguards on the transfer of nuclear tech-
nology. 4 During his administration, the United States began to develop
a consistent framework for conducting nuclear trade.80
The overall objective of the NNPA is to contain proliferation by lim-
iting the flow of sensitive nuclear technology and material., The
NNPA is comprised of a mixture of assurances, restrictions, and incen-
tives designed to enforce stricter controls over the supply of nuclear
material and technology. 7 The Act contains a complex framework af-
fecting agreements for cooperation,"' issuances of export licenses,89 and
81. Cross & Smith, supra note 13, at 638. See generally, Nye, Non-Proliferation.
A Long-Term Strategy, 56 FOREIGN AFF. 601 (1978) (discussing President Carter's
nuclear nonproliferation policy).
82. CONG. Q. ALMANAC, 1978, supra note 61, at 27E. In April 1977, President
Carter, in a message to Congress, proposed a strong nuclear nonproliferation policy. Id.
Carter stated in his message to Congress that one of the most pressing challenges of
mankind is the need to halt nuclear proliferation. Id.
83. Cross & Smith, supra note 13, at 638-39. President Carter successfully
checked the South Korean purchase of a reprocessing facility from France in 1976 and
curtailed an experimental nuclear program in Taiwan in 1977. Id. at 638. President
Carter also successfully convinced France to tighten up its nuclear export policies. Id.;
see Power, The Carter Anti-Plutonium Policy, 7 ENERGY POL'Y 215, 231 (1979) (dis-
cussing other successes in nonproliferation policy during the Carter administration).
84. Cross & Smith, supra note 13, at 638-39.
85. Id. The Carter administration attempted to develop nondiscriminatory global
policies to accommodate legitimate interests. Scheinman, supra note 1, at 363; see gen-
erally Nye, We Tried Harder (And Did More), 36 FOREIGN POL'Y 101 (1979) (de-
fending Carter's nuclear policies). But see Brenner, Carter's Bungled Promise, 36 FOR-
EIGN POL'Y 94 (1979) (attacking President Carter's nuclear supply policy as
discriminatory).
86. Cross & Smith, supra note 13, at 639. Under the NNPA, the IAEA safeguards
require application to all transfers of nuclear material, equipment, and technology im-
ported from the United States to non-nuclear weapon states. 42 U.S.C. § 2153 (1982).
The purpose of full-scope safeguards was to prevent recipient nations from diverting
nuclear material to weapon uses. Bettauer, supra note 50, at 1144. This provision of
the NNPA aimed at closing an advantage enjoyed by nonsignatories of the NPT who
were not obligated to comply in the past with IAEA safeguards over indigenously de-
veloped nuclear facilities. United States Controls, supra note 25, at 459. A basic pur-
pose of the safeguard requirement was to ensure the United States that it would have
"timely" warning of any diversion of its nuclear materials to non-peaceful uses. CONG.
Q. ALMANAC, 1978, supra note 61, at 350.
87. Ausness, supra note 5, at 96-97. See Marshall, Section 104 of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Act of 1978: Establishment of International Nuclear Supply Assur-
ances, II N.Y.U. J. INr'L L. & POL. 399, 402-04 (1979) (stating that the NNPA was
designed to strengthen control over nuclear exports).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 2153 (1982). The Secretary of State, with the assistance of the
Secretary of Energy and in consultation with the Director of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency negotiated agreements for cooperation. 42 U.S.C. § 2153(a)
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authorizations of "subsequent arrangements" for retransfer and storage
of spent fuel."
The legislation attempted to ensure that the United States would
continue as a major supplier of nuclear materials.9 1 In offering nations
a reliable supply of nuclear assistance, the United States hoped to deter
non-peaceful uses of nuclear technology by exercising powerful eco-
nomic leverage over recipient nations.9 2 Assistance is permissible only
where recipient nations agree to comply with imposed international
regulations and safeguards.9 3
The Act requires the United States to terminate cooperation when-
ever a recipient nation violates a commitment to international safe-
guards, or to the peaceful use of nuclear materials, equipment, or tech-
nology. 4 The President may waive this termination provision of the
(1982). The President will approve a completed agreement in writing after he deter-
mines that it will promote the common defense and security of the two nations. 42
U.S.C. § 2153(b) (1982). The proposed agreement is then submitted to Congress with
the approval of the President and becomes effective in 60 days unless Congress vetoes
it. 42 U.S.C. § 2153(d) (1982).
The NNPA requires agreements to specify that international safeguards will apply
to all peaceful nuclear activities of a recipient state. 42 U.S.C. § 2153(a)(6) (1982).
The agreements must also stipulate that no assistance will be provided to a state in the
development of any nuclear explosive device or related military purpose. 42 U.S.C. §
2153(a)(1) (1982). In addition, agreements for cooperation must allow the United
States to demand the return of any nuclear material and equipment if at any time a
recipient nation detonates a nuclear explosive or violates an IAEA Safeguards Agree-
ment. 42 U.S.C. § 2153(a)(4) (1982). The President is directed to renegotiate all ex-
isting agreements for cooperation in order to bring them into compliance with statutory
requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 2153c(a) (1982). See Ausness, supra note 5, at 97-99
(describing additional procedures for entering into agreements for cooperation).
89. 42 U.S.C. § § 2156-57 (1982). The Act mandates that the President will au-
thorize the sale of nuclear materials only to countries that have accepted full-scope
safeguards. 42 U.S.C. § 2157(a)(1) (1982). This provision is intended to remove the
advantage that nonsignatories of the NPT have over parties to the NPT. See Ausness,
supra note 5, at 96 (describing export licensing procedures and criteria).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 2160 (1982). A subsequent arrangement applies to United States
government approval of certain nuclear activities such as physical security measures,
spent fuel management, safeguards, and other matters considered important in prevent-
ing proliferation. Ausness, supra note 5, at 99; Stoiber, supra note 2, at 369.
91. CONG. Q. ALMANAC, 1978, supra note 61, at 352. See Stoiber, supra note 2, at
371 (explaining that the United States intended to benefit only those nations that
shared United States nonproliferation objectives).
92. 36 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 338 (1980) [hereinafter CONG. Q. ALMANAC, 1980];
Carrot and Stick Policy, supra note 3, at 36. As a major supplier, the United States
believed that it could supervise the material and technology through binding bilateral
supply agreements. Krauland, supra note 31, at 234. The United States believed it
could then attain leverage forcing concessions from recipient nations that other nuclear
suppliers might not require. Id.
93. 42 U.S.C. § 2153 (1982); see supra notes 37-48 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the international requirements in the NPT that recipient nations must adhere
to in order to receive nuclear materials from the United States).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 2158 (1982). The following conditions are grounds for the Presi-
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NNPA if he determines that cessation of exports will seriously inter-
fere with United States foreign policy objectives.9 Although the waiver
provision is rarely used, this provision gives the President great flexibil-
ity in conducting foreign affairs.96 By a concurrent resolution, however,
Congress may override the President's waiver .7
The success of the strategy of the NNPA depends upon the ability of
the United States to offer meaningful incentives to nations desiring nu-
clear technology. 98 Unfortunately, many countries perceive the unilat-
eral legislative actions of the United States as intrusive, and they are
not willing to accept the provisions of the Act.09 Some argue that the
NNPA has the opposite effect of that desired because it may encourage
nations to accelerate their own efforts to acquire nuclear energy and,
thus, may reduce their dependence on the United States.1 0 On the
other hand, President Carter had successfully declared a clear commit-
ment to nonproliferation objectives when he limited nuclear exports to
fully safeguarded nations.101
dent to terminate assistance: If a recipient nation (1) detonates a nuclear explosive; (2)
violates or withdraws from IAEA safeguards; (3) engages in activities leading to the
manufacture of a nuclear device; (4) materially violates any agreement under which it
receives nuclear assistance; (5) assists a non-nuclear weapon nation to develop a nu-
clear explosive device; or (6) transfers reprocessing equipment to any non-nuclear
weapon nation without prior approval under the terms of an agreement to which the
United States is a party. Id.; CONG. Q. AUIANAC, 1978, supra note 61, at 354.
95. 42 U.S.C. § 2158(2) (1982). The President must submit a presidential waiver
to Congress 60 days before the provision goes into force. Id. The President must find
that withholding nuclear assistance would "seriously prejudice the achievement of
United States non-proliferation objectives or would otherwise jeopardize the common
defense and security" of limited states. Id.
96. See United States Controls, supra note 25, at 460 (stating that the special
presidential waiver permits exports of nuclear materials to counties that refuse to com-
ply with the NNPA). This provision has been used only once since the enactment of
the NNPA. Note, Testing the Statutory Criteria for Foreign Policy: The Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 and the Export of Nuclear Fuel to India, 14 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 419, 423-24 (1982). In 1980, under the veto provisions, President
Carter authorized the sale of nuclear fuel to India for its nuclear energy reactor. Id.
97. 42 U.S.C. § 2158 (1982).
98. Carrot and Stick Policy, supra note 3, at 36. The United States offers incen-
tives ("carrots") in exchange for compliance with imposed regulations ("sticks"). Id. at
26. Under the NNPA, the "carrot" is the guarantee of a reliable fuel supply and the
"stick" is the requirement that recipient nations comply with IAEA safeguards. Id. at
36. See Bettauer, supra note 50, at 1178 (stating that the United States offers few
tangible incentives to other countries to accept these imposed controls).
99. Ausness, supra note 5, at 103.
100. Edwards, supra note 21, at 17. The legislation led to a series of confrontations
between the United States and some of its traditional trade customers. Id.; infra note
102 and accompanying text; see Ausness, supra note 5, at 103-05 (describing how
United States efforts to control sensitive nuclear technology created resentment among
less developed countries).
101. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text (discussing the Carter adminis-
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President Reagan also vowed to support nonproliferation objectives
when he took office. 10 2 The nonproliferation policies of the Reagan ad-
ministration, however, differ sharply from those principles that lie be-
hind the passage of the NNPA. 103 The Reagan administration policy
places greater emphasis on the United States as a reliable supplier of
nuclear materials, although it only allows exports to its allies, and
stresses the need to design security measures that will reduce the at-
tractiveness of the nuclear option to non-nuclear states.104
Reliability of supply is a fundamental principle incorporated in the
NNPA. 10 5 The Carter administration exported only to nations that
shared United States nonproliferation objectives. 106 The Reagan ad-
ministration, on the other hand, transfers nuclear materials to nations
that have not accepted full international safeguards.107 As a result, na-
tions that do not share United States nonproliferation objectives can
nevertheless receive a reliable supply of nuclear assistance.108
Furthermore, unlike the policy of the Carter administration, Presi-
dent Reagan's policy is selective and discriminatory.109 The Reagan ad-
ministration asserts that it makes distinctions between countries based
on an assessment of their proliferation risks.11' 0 In reality, this policy
permits the Reagan administration to export to nations that are
deemed important allies.1 ' These nations often receive immunity from
tration's successes in limiting the flow of nuclear exports).
102. Miller, Reagan Announces a Policy to Curb the Spread of Nuclear Weapons,
N.Y. Times, July 17, 1981, at A4. President Reagan emphasized the importance of
limiting nuclear weapon proliferation from his very first statement on nonproliferation.
Id.
103. Cross & Smith, supra note 13, at 641-42. See infra notes 106-117 (discussing
the different policies of Presidents Reagan and Carter).
104. Clausen, The Reagan Nonproliferation Policy: A Critical Midterm Look,
ARMS CONTROL TODAY, Dec. 1982, at 1; Cross & Smith, supra note 13, at 641.
105. 22 U.S.C. § 3201(b) (1982). The NNPA states that the United States will
"take such actions as are required to confirm the reliability of the United States in
meeting its commitments to supply nuclear reactors and fuel to nations which adhere to
effective non-proliferation policies. . . ." Id.
106. 33 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 27E (1977) [hereinafter CONG. Q. ALMANAC, 1977).
In his April 27, 1977 message to Congress on nonproliferation, President Carter stated
that the United States would supply nuclear materials to nations that "genuinely
share" a "desire for non-proliferation." Id.
107. Cross & Smith, supra note 13, at 641-44.
108. Id. at 644.
109. Scheinman, supra note 1, at 356. President Carter sought to develop a global
and comprehensive nuclear nonproliferation policy. Id. at 363.
110. Id. at 363; Cross & Smith, supra note 13, at 645-46.
111. Cross & Smith, supra note 13, at 645. The Reagan administration considers
Western European countries, Japan, and other industrialized nations important allies
for purposes of nuclear exports. Id.
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certain NNPA provisions. 1  Yet, while United States control over nu-
clear materials and technology has softened under the Reagan adminis-
tration, the new policy approach obtains nothing in exchange from
these nations to increase the prospects of nonproliferation."'
Finally, the nuclear export strategy of the Reagan administration at-
tempts to address the security fears of its trading partners.11 ' The Rea-
gan administration has encouraged arms sales, direct security ties, and
other measures to increase global security.115 The goal of this strategy
is to make an independent nuclear force less attractive by resolving the
strategic fears that govern the decision of a nation to develop nuclear
weaponry.11 6 The inherent limitation in this strategy, as exposed in
United States dealings with Pakistan, is that nonproliferation goals
often suffer at the expense of other foreign policy objectives. "
C. PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR POLICY
In recent years, Pakistan's clandestine pursuit of a nuclear program
has created suspicion that it desired to obtain the technological capabil-
ity to manufacture nuclear weapons.118 The Pakistani government de-
nies allegations that it is attempting to develop nuclear technology for
military purposes. 19 Many commentators, however, view Pakistan's re-
112. Id. at 644. These nations, favored under the Reagan administration's export
policy, are not required to receive approval for each instance in which they transfer
United States-supplied fuel. Id.; see Oberdorfer, Administration Moving to Loosen
Laws on Curbs for Nuclear Weapons Abroad, Wash. Post, Oct. 11, 1981, at Al, A6
(describing the Reagan administration's attempt to rewrite the NNPA).
113. See Cross & Smith, supra note 13, at 646 (explaining that while the Reagan
administration loosened controls on plutonium, the United States obtained nothing in
return to help achieve its nonproliferation objectives); Legislation to Amend the Nu-
clear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Foreign
Affairs and its Subcomm. on International Security and Scientific Affairs and Interna-
tional Economic Policy and Trade, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 117 (1982) (quoting state-
ment of Representative Bingham, who felt that the administration was taking risks
without enunciating the concessions it hoped to get from its allies).
114. Cross & Smith, supra note 13, at 647. Many of the emerging nonproliferation
risks such as Argentina, South Korea, Taiwan, and Pakistan have anticommunist gov-
ernments; therefore, nonproliferation efforts provide President Reagan with a conven-
ient excuse for the development of closer ties with these nations. Id.
115. Id. at 647.
116. L. DUNN, CONTROLLING THE BoMB 125-28, 155-56 (1982).
117. See infra notes 142-203 and accompanying text (discussing United States
nonproliferation policy as applies to Pakistan).
118. Rais, supra note 10, at 458.
119. Nuclear Weapons and South Asian Security, REPORT OF THE CARNEGIE
TASK FORCE ON NON-PROLIFERATION AND SoUTH AsIAN SECURITY 18 (1988) [herein-
after CARNEGIE TASK FORCE REPORT SOUTH ASIA]; Pakistan Will Not Be Diverted
From Pursuing Peaceful Nuclear Program, PAKISTAN AFF., Aug. 14, 1987, at 1 [here-
inafter Pursuing Peaceful Nuclear Program]; President Mohammed Zia ul-Haq Ad-
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fusal to sign the NPT, its rejections of IAEA safeguards, and its clan-
destine nuclear activities as an indication of a less than peaceful
intent. 12 o
The origins of the nuclear program in Pakistan can be traced to the
mid-1950s when the Pakistani government took advantage of the
United Nations' Atoms for Peace initiative.' 21 The Pakistani govern-
ment's goal was to establish a comprehensive nuclear energy plan. 22
The creation of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) in
1955, whose purpose was to plan the development of nuclear energy in
Pakistan, was the first important step in the establishment of this com-
prehensive program. 23 In the 1950s, however, Pakistan chose not to
allocate significant resources to developing nuclear energy. 12 4 The atti-
tude in Pakistan toward the development of nuclear power remained
the same during the 1960s5.2
In the 1970s, however, the dynamics of Pakistan's nuclear program
changed dramatically."" A number of economic, political, and security
dress to the Majis-e-shoora, PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM, July 10, 1984. But cf.
Doerner, supra note 8, at 42 (interviewing President Zia who acknowledged that Paki-
stan's nuclear research program has the means to develop a nuclear weapon).
120. SPECTOR, NUCLEAR NATIONS, supra note 8, at 283-89 (stating that Pakistan
was secretly trying to manufacture nuclear weapons). But see Rais, supra note 118, at
462 (asserting that the unwillingness of Pakistan to sign the NPT and its rejection of
full-scope safeguards is wrongly perceived as an attempt to acquire nuclear capability
for military purposes).
121. Betts, supra note 62, at 99. In January 1955, Pakistan established its first
nuclear reactor research institute. Id.; see Rais, supra note 10, at 464-66 (stating that
in this period Pakistan pursued a broad program of research and development).
122. Cronin, Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia, 37 MIDDLE E. J.
595, 600 (1983). A committee of highly respected scientists formed the plan. Id. As a
part of the plan, the Pakistani government sent civilian scientists and engineers abroad
to obtain training in Western countries. Id. Many of the scientists trained abroad, how-
ever, did not return to work in Pakistan. Id. In recent years, Pakistan has had more
success in recruiting these scientists because job opportunities in the West declined and
Pakistan has become more dedicated to nuclear energy. Betts, supra note 62, at 100.
123. Rais, supra note 10, at 465. The commission was assigned a variety of activi-
ties, including the production of nuclear power, application of nuclear radiation, and
management of the nuclear fuel cycle. Id. Dr. Nazir Ahmad was appointed the first
chairman of the commission. Cronin, supra note 122, at 600.
124. Akram, No Bombs in South Asia, REGIONAL PERSP., Institute of Regional
Studies, Islamabad 1 (1987). Before the 1970s, Pakistan was ambivalent in its ap-
proach to nuclear energy. Id.; see Betts, supra note 62, at 99 (stating that prior to
1972, Pakistan had fewer than 600 nuclear trained scientists).
125. Kapur, Pakistan's Nuclear Development: A Note on Approach and History, 6
ARMS CONTROL TODAY 243, 251 (1985). In 1965, Pakistan concluded an agreement
with Canada to purchase a commercial nuclear power plant. Ebinger, U.S. Nuclear
Non-Proliferation: The Pakistan Controversy, FLETCHER F., Summer 1979, at 1. The
nuclear reactor, however, was not operational until 1972. Id.
126. Akram, supra note 124, at 2. The oil price hike imposed in the early 1970s
imposed a crushing burden on Pakistan's economy. Id. Approximately 50 percent of
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factors12 contributed to the now fervent desire of Pakistan to establish
a viable, independent nuclear program. The impetus behind the Pakis-
tani nuclear program was the desire to achieve military parity with its
archrival India through the development of the atomic bomb.1 28
In the period between 1972 and 1977, Prime Minister Zulifiquar Ail
Bhutto was responsible for all important nuclear decisions, 20 and fo-
Pakistan's export earnings was spent on importing petroleum. Id. As a result, Pakistan
sought to acquire nuclear energy to meet its growing energy demands, poor energy
resource base, and its high cost of imported energy. Rais, supra note 10, at 459. See
EMBASSY OF PAKISTAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM, Pakistan Today, (available at Embassy of
Pakistan, Washington, D.C.) (stating that Pakistan sought to achieve a degree of inde-
pendence in its nuclear program).
In the 1970s, the nuclear program in Pakistan started to receive widespread domestic
popularity because it was viewed as a way to enhance the prestige of the nation and its
leadership role among Islamic countries. Rais, supra note 10, at 462. Former Prime
Minister Zulifiquar Ail Bhutto successfully used the Indian nuclear test to mobilize
Pakistani public opinion, to generate world public opinion against India, and to
strengthen his links to the Islamic world. Kapur, supra note 125, at 253; Ebinger,
supra note 125, at 2-3.
Pakistan's rivalry with India was a major motivating force behind its increased inter-
est in acquiring nuclear weapons. Id. Since the creation of Pakistan in 1947, India and
Pakistan fought three wars against each other; in 1947-1948 and 1965, they fought
over the Kashmir region, a territory approximately 86,000 square miles at the apex of
the frontiers of Afghanistan, China, India, and Pakistan; and then again in 1971 a
dispute arose, which was the result of civil war in East Pakistan. Id.
In the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war, and the subsequent 1971 war, the balance of power
was substantially altered in favor of India. Id. Prior to these defeats, Pakistani leaders
believed that their military was as strong as that of India. Id. India prevailed in both
wars and revealed that its military power was far superior to that of Pakistan. Id. The
conviction of Pakistan that India wanted to dominate the region led Pakistan to con-
sider the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Id. Furthermore, in the early 1970s, Pakistani
fears of nuclear intentions in India again strongly influenced the decisionmaking of the
Pakistani government. Id. See CARNEGIE TASK FORCE REPORT. SOUTH ASIA, supra
note 119, at 27-36 (describing the Indian-Pakistan rivalry).
127. After India detonated a nuclear explosive, Pakistan felt strategically justified
and compelled to develop its own nuclear weapons program. See Akram, supra note
124, at 2-3 (explaining that the Indian explosion created a military and political threat
to Pakistan). Former Prime Minister Bhutto once warned the nation that if India ac-
quired nuclear status, Pakistan would have to follow suit, even if it entailed "eating
grass." Kapur, supra note 125, at 243.
128. S. WEISMAN & H. KROSKY, THE IsLAitc BOMB 161-223 (1981).
Pakistan regards the acquisition of nuclear capability as an important check on nu-
clear designs in India. Akram, supra note 124, at 9. The Indian explosion weakened
the strategic position of Pakistan in South Asia. Ebinger, supra note 125, at 7. Paki-
stan desires nuclear capability to counter the huge disparities that exist in the conven-
tional forces of India and Pakistan; see Betts, supra note 62, at 124-26; ARMS CON-
TROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, WORLD MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND ARMS
TRANSFERS 1971-80 52, 62 (1983) (showing that the armed forces numbered 1.28 mil-
lion in India and 550,000 in Pakistan, and that military expenditures amounted to over
$4 billion in India and $1.13 billion in Pakistan).
129. Kapur, supra note 125, at 252. Former Prime Minister Bhutto took charge of
the nuclear program and made the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission per-
sonally responsible to him. Cronin, supra note 122, at 605.
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cused the Pakistani nuclear program. 130 Under his guidance, the objec-
tive of Pakistan was to acquire nuclear power through the production
of plutonium.' 3' During the Bhutto regime, scientific leadership was or-
ganized, the development of a clandestine nuclear program emerged,
and extensive efforts to purchase nuclear materials, technology, and
equipment from the West and African nations began.'32
After Bhutto was overthrown in 1977 and General Mohammed Zia
Ul-Haq ascended to power, the focus of the nuclear program in Paki-
stan changed. 33 General Zia promoted the production of highly en-
riched uranium 3 4 to build nuclear weapons.'35 In addition, the nuclear
program in Pakistan was moved under the complete control and super-
vision of the military.3 6
Because of its development of some critical areas of nuclear technol-
ogy, Pakistan is believed to have attained a degree of expertise. 137 The
general presumption is that the nuclear program in Pakistan is capable
of producing weapons-grade material to build a nuclear device at its
Kahuta uranium enrichment plant, but that Pakistan has not con-
ducted a nuclear test.138 The central effort of the Pakistani nuclear
130. Kapur, supra note 125, at 252. Bhutto stated in what was to be his final testi-
mony before his death: "When I took charge of Pakistan's Atomic Energy Commission,
it was no more than a signboard on an office. Assiduously and with granite determina-
tion, I put my entire vitality behind the task of acquiring nuclear capability for my
country." Cronin, supra note 122, at 605.
131. Kapur, supra note 125, at 252. The foundation for the uranium enrichment
route to a nuclear weapon was also formulated during the Bhutto period. Id.; see
Cronin, supra note 122, at 600-02 (discussing the nuclear capabilities of Pakistan in
general and its plutonium capabilities in particular).
132. Kapur, supra note 125, at 252. A deal with France for a reprocessing plant
temporarily enhanced the prospect of a Pakistani plutonium bomb. Id. at 253. The deal
with the French was safeguarded and cleared by the IAEA. Id. The plant would have
had the capacity to reprocess about 100 tons of spent fuel under IAEA safeguards.
Rais, supra note 10, at 467. The French later cancelled this deal after heavy pressure
from President Carter. Cross & Smith, supra note 13, at 639.
133. Kapur, supra note 125, at 253. The cancellation of the French agreement
dashed any Pakistani hopes of taking the plutonium route to the bomb. Keeping Up
With Neighbors, ECONOMIST, May 25, 1985, at 32.
134. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing the various routes to
developing nuclear wehpon capability).
135. Kapur, supra note 125, at 253; See CARNEGIE TASK FORCE REPORT: SOUTH
ASIA, supra note 119, at 15 (stating that the core of the atomic weapon used by the
United States against Japan in World War II at Hiroshima was made from highly
enriched uranium).
136. Cronin, supra note 122, at 605; Kapur, supra note 125, at 253.
137. See CARNEGIE TASK FORCE REPORT: SOUTH ASIA, supra note 119, at 15-18
(explaining that Pakistan has the technological capability to refine uranium and has
the facility for transforming natural uranium into a gasified form that serves as the
fuel for the enrichment process).
138. Albright, Pakistan's Bomb-Making Capacity, BULL. ATOM. Sci. 30, 32 (June
1987). Pakistan has publicly acknowledged the operation of a uranium centrifuge en-
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weapons program is the Kahuta uranium enrichment plant, 1"0 which
allegedly is based on designs illegally obtained from the Netherlands
and a equipment security system purchased elsewhere in the West. 4"
Uncertainty persists, however, because of the clandestine nature of Pa-
kistan's nuclear program.'
D. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES - PAKISTAN
RELATIONSHIP
Historically, the United States strategic interests in South Asia have
largely influenced its relations with Pakistan. 142 During the mid-1970s,
the nuclear program in Pakistan caused increased apprehension in the
United States when the Carter administration suspected that Pakistan
richment plant in the village of Kahuta. CARNEGIE TASK FORCE REPORT:. SOUTH ASIA.
supra note 119, at 15. It is estimated that Pakistan has produced enough highly en-
riched uranium since late 1985 or early 1986 at the Kahuta plant to develop an atomic
bomb. Id. at 16; Ottaway, Caution Urged on Aid to Pakistan, Wash. Post, Oct. 23,
1987, at A14 [hereinafter Caution Urged on Aid to Pakistan]; Ottaway, Pakistani A-
Bomb Seen Likely, Wash. Post, Mar. 8, 1987, at Al [hereinafter Pakistan A-Bomb
Seen Likely]; Woodward, Pakistan Reported Near Atom Arms Production, Wash.
Post, Nov. 4, 1986, at Al [hereinafter Pakistan Near Atom Arms Production]; US.
Aid to Pakistan: Hearings Before the Subcomin. on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1987 (statement of Richard T. Ken-
nedy, Ambassador At Large for Non-Proliferation).
139. See Betts, supra note 62, at 102 (asserting that construction of the uranium
enrichment plant at Kahuta was an indication that Pakistan wanted to pursue nuclear
weapons capability). Furthermore, the Pakistanis tried clandestinely to build the plant.
Id. The Carter administration's discovery of this project led him to invoke the Syming-
ton Amendment. Cronin, supra note 122, at 602. Pakistan could in theory use this
facility to produce weapons-quality highly enriched uranium. SPECTOR, NUCLEAR NA-
TIONS, supra note 8, at 114. Because the plant is not subject to IAEA controls, Paki-
stan can use its output to develop nuclear arms without violating international regula-
tions. Id.
140. SPECTOR: NUCLEAR NATIONS, supra note 8, at 114; CARNEGIE TASK FORCE
REPORT: SOUTH ASIA, supra note 119, at 15. Because the components of the Kahuta
plant were obtained illegally, no western nation was able to demand that the facility be
placed under IAEA safeguards. Id.
141. Rais, supra note 10, at 458; see supra note 139 and accompanying text (as-
serting that Pakistan can develop weapons-grade material).
142. T. ELIOT, JR. & R. PFALTZGRAFF, JR., UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD PA-
KISTAN, in THE RED ARMY ON PAKISTAN'S BORDER: POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
UNITED STATES 70 (Eliot, Jr. & Pfaltzgraff, Jr. eds. 1986); Betts, supra note 62, at
358. Until the late 1970s, the United States had a limited interest in the affairs of
South Asia or Pakistan, beyond nonproliferation. Id. Nonproliferation, at that time,
was considered important enough to require massive military commitments and politi-
cal involvements. Id. Although by the 1950s, the United States had already established
military ties with Pakistan because of its overriding concern to contain Soviet influence
in the region. PAKISTAN-UNITED STATES RELATIONS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL
SYmPosium HELD AT ISLAMABAD, Area Study Centre for Africa, North and South Af-
rica, Quadi-Azam Univ. 12 (R. Khan ed. 1983) [hereinafter PAKISTAN-UNITED STATES
RELATIONS].
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was trying to develop a nuclear weapon. 143 In response, President
Carter attempted to restrict the flow of nuclear technology to Paki-
stan,144 and in 1979, he invoked the Symington Amendment to the For-
eign Assistance Act of 1961,'45 thereby terminating aid to Pakistan.
The Symington Amendment prohibits aid to nations that deal in nu-
clear enrichment equipment, material, or technology but refuse to sub-
mit to international safeguards.146 United States aid was suspended to
Pakistan when it refused to open its nuclear enrichment plant to inter-
national safeguards and inspection.147
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 changed the priorities of
United States policy toward Pakistan. 4 s The Reagan administration
decided to develop closer relations with Pakistan to counter the per-
ceived Soviet threat in South Asia. 49 In 1981, Congress enacted a leg-
islative measure that enabled the President to waive, for six years, the
application of the Symington Amendment'" to Pakistan and, conse-
quently, allowed the restoration of United States security assistance.
Adoption of this legislation was necessary as the President was not
able to use the waiver provision of the Symington Amendment' 5' with-
143. See CARNEGIE TASK FORCE REPORT: SOUTH ASIA, supra note 119, at 159
(reporting that in 1979, the United States discovered that Pakistan was acquiring en-
richment technology from Western Europe and was building an unsafeguarded nuclear
plant).
144. Cross & Smith, supra note 13, at 656. The Carter administration successfully
won concessions of restraint from European suppliers. Id. Most Western suppliers re-
fused to sell nuclear materials and technology to Pakistan without guarantees. D.
PONEMAN, supra note 4, at 194. Switzerland, however, refused United States requests
to restrict its nuclear exports to Pakistan. CONG. Q. ALMANAC, 1980, supra note 92, at
343.
145. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 § 669 Pub. L. 97-113, title VII § 737(b), Dec.
29, 1981, 95 Stat. 1562 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2429 (1982)).
146. Id. The ban does not apply to countries that agree to adhere to the system of
international inspections in the NPT. 43 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 1668 (1987) [hereinafter
CONG. Q. ALMANAC, 1987].
147. THE PLUTONIUM BUSINESS, supra note 44, at 137. The aid that the United
States cancelled in 1979 was less than $100 million. Betts, supra note 62, at 353. Dur-
ing the cutoff, Pakistan was able to receive help from other allies to offset its loss of
United States aid. CARNEGIE TASK FORCE REPORT: SOUTH ASIA, supra note 119, at
163 n.4.
148. Carrot and Stick Policy, supra note 3, at 43. The 1979 Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan provided an important opportunity for Pakistan, as it reemerged as a stra-
tegic asset in the perception of the United States. Kapur, supra note 125, at 254.
149. 37 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 125 (1981) [hereinafter CONG. Q. ALMANAC, 1981];
PAKISTAN-UNITED STATES RELATIONS, supra note 142, at 172. A Reagan administra-
tion spokesman told Congress that the United States intended to construct a new rela-
tionship with Pakistan, which would evolve over a long period of time, and would serve
the best interests of both countries. Id. at 173.
150. 22 U.S.C. § 2375 (1982) amended by 22 U.S.C § 2375 (supp. IV 1986).
151. 22 U.S.C. § 2429(b)(1) (1982).
[VOL. 4:91
PAKISTAN AND NON-PROLIFERATION
out the "reliable assurances" required to certify that Pakistan was not
acquiring or developing nuclear weapons.1 2 Yet Congress, also
amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 that restricted the Presi-
dent's authority should Pakistan or any other non-nuclear weapon state
detonate a nuclear weapon.'53
Under President Reagan's directive, Congress approved a six-year,
$3.2 billion aid package for Pakistan.' " Many Congressional leaders
opposed giving such unconditional aid to Pakistan' 5 on the grounds
that Pakistan did not make any substantial concessions over its nuclear
program. 58 Although Congress had waived the Symington Amendment
requirements, Pakistan was still possibly in violation of the Glenn
Amendment. 57 The Glenn Amendment requires the termination of
United States aid in the event that any non-nuclear weapon state ac-
quires reprocessing technology or equipment without implementing in-
ternational safeguards. 8
At this time, Pakistan was importing technology for the Kahuta
plant without the requisite IAEA safeguards. This triggered the Glenn
amendment, mandating the termination of aid to Pakistan. 5 ' Another
152. CARNEGIE TASK FORCE REPORT- SOUTH AsIA, supra note 119, at 159. A two-
and-a-half-year renewal of the 1981 legislation suspending the Symington Amendment
was enacted in late 1987 because President Reagan was unable to obtain reliable assur-
ances of the nuclear activities in Pakistan. P.L. 100-202, § 669, amending Foreign
Assistance Act § 620E(d).
153. 22 U.S.C. § 2429(b) (1982) [hereinafter Glenn Amendment]. The Glenn
Amendment was strengthened because the President was precluded from using its
waiver for at least 30 days unless a joint resolution passed by a majority of both Con-
gressional houses authorized its use. Id.
154. CONG. Q. ALANAC, 1981, supra note 149, at 125. President Reagan spon-
sored a massive aid package to Pakistan to put into practice his policy of seeking better
relations with that country. Id. The aid package was aimed at bolstering Pakistan's
security against Soviet pressures. SPECTOR, NUCLEAR NATIONS, supra note 8, at 116.
155. CONG. Q. ALMANAC, 1981, supra note 149, at 173. Many Congressional lead-
ers such as Senator Glenn wanted Pakistan to firmly commit itself not to pursue nu-
clear weapons technology. Id. Critics of the aid package feared that it might upset the
balance of power between Pakistan and India. Id.
156. See generally Cross & Smith, supra note 13 (discussing President Reagan's
failure to extract concessions from Pakistan prior to approving aid packages).
157. 22 U.S.C. § 2429(b) (1982); CARNEGIE TAsK FORCE REPORT. SoUTH AIA,
supra note 119, at 160. Apparently, Pakistan secretly purchased reprocessing equip-
ment. Id.
In 1977, President Carter, without formally invoking the Glenn Amendment, sus-
pended aid to Pakistan for approximately one year because Pakistan was importing
reprocessing technology from France. CARNEGIE TASK FORCE REPORT. SOUTH AIA,
supra note 119, at 160. In 1979, France stopped transferring reprocessing technology
to Pakistan after heavy pressure from the Carter administration. Cross & Smith, supra
note 13, at 643.
158. 22 U.S.C. § 2429(b) (1982).
159. 22 U.S.C. 2429(b) (1982). The United States made diplomatic efforts to cur-
tail the development of this plant, but these efforts were undermined when Pakistan
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provision in the Glenn amendment, however, permits the President to
waive the termination of aid if he determines that the elimination of
assistance would be "seriously prejudicial to the achievement of non-
proliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardizes the common defense
and security" of nations.6 In February 1982, the President exercised
this authority and restored aid to Pakistan.161
In July 1984, tension between the United States and Pakistan
heightened when three Pakistani agents were arrested in the United
States for trying to smuggle high-speed electronic switches used to
detonate nuclear weapons out of the country. 6 2 United States intelli-
gence reports indicated that these devices were destined for the Paki-
stan nuclear program.' 63 In September 1984, President Reagan wrote
to General Zia expressing concern over nuclear activities in Pakistan
and sought assurances that the completed Kahuta plant would not pro-
duce weapons-grade material. 64
In response to United States protests regarding the smuggling inci-
dent, and President Reagan's September letter, President Zia promised
not to produce weapons-grade uranium. 6 5 Despite Pakistan's attempt
received assistance from China and other nations. Cronin, supra note 122, at 602. The
Reagan administration suspended talks with China on nuclear cooperation because it
was concerned about possible Chinese assistance to the nuclear enrichment program in
Pakistan. Id. at 603. China allegedly helped Pakistan operate its unsafeguarded ura-
nium enrichment plant, conducted a nuclear test in the presence of a Pakistani official,
and provided important nuclear design data. Milhollin, supra note 62, at 174. But see
Kapur, supra note 125, at 245 (alleging that Chinese involvement in the nuclear affairs
- of Pakistan is mere speculation).
160. 22 U.S.C. § 2429(b) (1982).
161. Presidential Determination 82-7 (February 10, 1982), 3 C.F.R. § 241 (1983).
162. CONG. Q. ALMANAC, 1987, supra note 146, at 1688. See L. Spector, Averting
a Race to a Nuclear Armageddon, FAR E. ECON. REv., Sept. 26, 1987, at 37 (noting
that the 1984 smuggling incident confirmed fears that Pakistan was actively pursuing
nuclear-weapons capability).
163. SPECTOR, NUCLEAR NATIONS, supra note 8, at 116; Atkinson, Nuclear Parts
Sought by Pakistanis, Wash. Post, July 21, 1984, at A12.
164. SPECTOR, NUCLEAR NATIONS, supra note 8, at 116; Ignatius, U.S. Pressuring
Pakistan to Abandon Controversial Nuclear-Arms Programs, Wall St. J., Oct. 25,
1984, at 37. Pakistan completed the Kahuta plant between 1981 and 1984. CARNEGIE
TASK FORCE REPORT: SOUTH ASIA, supra note 119, at 161. President Reagan's letter
was seeking assurances that General Zia would not enrich uranium to more than five
percent at the Kahuta plant. Id. Below five percent, the enriched uranium is not usable
for nuclear weapons. Id. The President's letter warned of grave consequences for
United States-Pakistan relations if uranium was enriched beyond this level. Id.; see
Oberdorfer, Pakistan Spurns Soviet's Afghan Pullout Plan, Wash. Post, July 18,
1986, at A28 (reporting that Pakistani Prime Minister, Junejo, stated that the enriched
uranium at the Kahuta plant had not reached five percent).
165. CONG. Q. ALMANAC, 1987, supra note 146, at 1668. SPECTOR, NUCLEAR NA-
TIONS, supra note 8, at 117-118. The promise of Pakistan to comply with Reagan's
terms was an attempt to ease tensions. Id. The Soviet bombing on October 12 of Af-
ghan refugee camps in Pakistan triggered concerns over the prospects of increased So-
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to violate United States laws, the President and Congress remained
committed to continued support of Pakistan168 and rejected a proposed
law that would have put more restrictions on aid to Pakistan.1 6 7
Eventually, the popular furor set off by the 1984 smuggling incident
together with another nuclear material smuggling incident involving Is-
raeli citizens 68 led to the implementation of legislation in 1985
designed to restrain, specifically, the Pakistani nuclear program without
requiring the termination of United States assistance."' The Solarz
amendment barred aid to nations that violate United States export laws
to obtain nuclear technology, material, or equipment that could signifi-
cantly assist in the manufacture of a nuclear bomb.170 Another Con-
gressional amendment targeted Pakistani nuclear activities by requiring
the President to certify each year, as a condition of aid, that: (1) Paki-
stan does not possess a nuclear weapon; and (2) such aid will signifi-
cantly reduce the risk that Pakistan will possess one.17'
The 1985 Solarz amendment was designed to deter Pakistan from
building a nuclear device.'7 2 President Zia's announcement in 1985,
however, that Pakistan possessed the capability to produce low-en-
riched uranium, revealed the ability of Pakistan to produce weapons-
grade uranium. 73 Both in late 1985 and again in late 1986, and despite
viet military aggression against Pakistan. Id.
166. SPECTOR, NUCLEAR NATIONS, supra note 8, at 107.
167. Id. at 117. Under Senator Alan Cranston's proposal, aid would be terminated
unless the President certified that Pakistan was not developing a nuclear explosive de-
vice or acquiring technology, material, or equipment with the intent of manufacturing
or detonating a nuclear explosive device. Id. The amendment was never formally intro-
duced because it lacked support. Id. at 286 n.27.
168. CARNEGIE TASK FORCE REPORT. SOUTH ASIA, supra note 119, at 162. In
May 1984, a California businessman was indicted for smuggling high speed electronic
devices, known as krytons, to Israel. Id. Israel claimed that the nuclear equipment was
for non-nuclear purposes. SPECTOR, NUCLEAR NATIONS, supra note 8, at 287 n.37.
169. SPECTOR, NUCLEAR NATIONS, supra note 8, at 119-20.
170. 22 U.S.C. § 2429 (1982) amended by 22 U.S.C. § 2429(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
Cf. SPECTOR, NUCLEAR NATIONS, supra note 8, at 287 n.37 (noting that the President
can waive the Solarz Amendment if he finds that exported items are not intended for
use in nuclear weapons); 22 U.S.C. § 2429(b) (1982) (holding that the President can
also waive this law if he invokes the waiver provision of the Glenn Amendment).
171. 22 U.S.C. § 2375(e) (Supp. IV 1986). The 1985 certification requirement
bars aid and military sales to Pakistan if the President determines that Pakistan pos-
sesses a nuclear device. Id. This provision is only applicable to Pakistan and requires
the President to certify each fiscal year that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explo-
sive. Id.
172. See S. REP. No. 34, reprinted in 99th Cong. 1st Sess. 14 (1985) U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 158,173 (reporting on the legislative history of the 1985 So-
larz Amendment).
173. SPECTOR, NUCLEAR NATIONS, supra note 8, at 118. Pakistani officials claim
that the output limit of the Kahuta plant is below five percent enriched uranium, mak-
ing it, in theory, far below the 90 percent level required for nuclear weapons. Id. Owing
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this major revelation, President Reagan certified and continued to pro-
vide Pakistan with aid." 4
By 1986, United States officials believed that Pakistan developed the
technology and possessed the materials, including the necessary en-
riched uranium, to build its first atomic bomb." 5 President Reagan,
nonetheless, did not enforce his warning to President Zia prohibiting
high enrichment at the Kahuta plant.7 6 In fact, Pakistan's nuclear ac-
tivities had no apparent negative impact on United States-Pakistani re-
lations in 1986, and, moreover, the Reagan administration again of-
fered a six-year aid package to Pakistan in the amount of $4.02 billion
to begin when the 1981 aid package expired.Y
II. UNITED STATES NONPROLIFERATION STRATEGY
VIS-Ak-VIS PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR POLICY
President Reagan's nonproliferation policy toward Pakistan empha-
sized incentives to discourage proliferation in the event that Pakistan
were to take further steps toward nuclear weapons capability. 7 8 Under
this policy, the United States gives political, military, and economic aid
to PakistanY.7 9 The policy, also contains counterincentive laws to influ-
ence Pakistani conduct by threatening to terminate economic and mili-
tary assistance. 80 These approaches, thus far, have not resulted in
to the uniqueness of uranium, however, approximately 75 percent of the enrichment
process is completed when uranium is enriched to five percent. Albright, supra note 8,
at 30.
174. CARNEGIE TASK FORCE REPORT: SOUTH ASIA, supra note 119, at 162.
175. Pakistan Reported Near Atom Arms Production, supra note 138, at Al;
Pakistani A-Bomb Seen Likely, supra note 138, at A8; Caution Urged on Aid to Paki-
stan, supra note 138, at A14; Albright, supra note 8, at 30.
176. CARNEGIE TASK FORCE REPORT: SOUTH ASIA, supra note 119, at 161; see
supra note 164 and accompanying text (discussing the 1984 Reagan letter to President
Zia).
177. T. ELIOT & R. PFALTZGRAFF, supra note 142, at 73. On March 24, 1986, the
two governments agreed on an aid package consisting of $2.28 billion in economic aid
and $1.74 billion in military aid. Id.
178. See CARNEGIE TASK FORCE REPORT: SOUTH ASIA, supra note 119, at 130(discussing the massive United States military and economic aid program for Paki-
stan); Cronin, supra note 122, at 613 (noting that the current policy involves incentives
and disincentives). In the 1980s, President Reagan gave massive military and economic
aid to Pakistan. Cross & Smith, supra note 13, at 655. In 1981, the United States gave
Pakistan, for a six year period, $3.02 billion in economic and military aid. T. ELIOT &
R. PFALTZGRAFF, supra note 142, at 73.
179. Cross & Smith, supra note 13, at 655 (describing United States aid to Paki-
stan during the Reagan administration).
180. CARNEGIE TASK FORCE REPORT: SOUTH ASIA, supra note 119. The important
United States laws pertaining to nuclear conduct in Pakistan are: Foreign Assistance
Act of 1961, § 659 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2429 (1982)); Foreign Assis-
tance Act of 1961, § 670 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2429B (1982)); and
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Pakistani nuclear concessions."8 "
A. PROBLEMS IN UNITED STATES-PAKISTAN RELATIONS IN THE
1980s
On July 10, 1987, a Pakistani-born Canadian was arrested in Phila-
delphia on charges of attempting to illegally export special hardened
steel, that is used in refining heavily enriched uranium, to Pakistan. 182
The incident put the 1987 Pakistani aid package in jeopardy.183 Re-
sponding to domestic pressure, President Reagan suspended the aid
package until a determination could be made on whether the Pakistani
government was involved.8
Some Congressional leaders demanded that President Reagan en-
force the 1985 amendments and cut off aid to Pakistan altogether.185
The Reagan administration, however, delayed its response to the situa-
tion until the facts were clarified and Pakistan had an opportunity to
provide verifiable evidence to ensure United States leaders that it was
not producing enriched weapons-grade uranium1"8 Even under the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 § 620E(l)(e) (codified as amended at 22 U..C. §
2375 (Supp. IV 1986); see supra notes 145-77 and accompanying text (discussing
United States nonproliferation laws and their impact on Pakistan).
181. Carrot and Stick Policy, supra note 3, at 44; CARNEGIE TASK FORCE RE-
PORT: SOUTH AsIA, supra note 119, at 52. United States nonproliferation measures did
not prevent Pakistan from completing the Kahuta enrichment plant or from apparently
obtaining sufficient amounts of highly enriched uranium to produce a nuclear device.
Id.
182. Pakistan Must Act, supra note 16, at A22; CONG. Q. ALM4ANAC, 1987, supra
note 146, at 1668. Court documents allege that the suspect, Arshad Pervez, worked for
a retired brigadier general named Inam UI-Haq, who lives in Lahore, Pakistan. Id. The
Pakistan government issued a warrant for Ul-Haq's arrest. Id. The Government of Pa-
kistan also instituted an investigation into the alleged attempt by Pervez to export nu-
clear materials to Pakistan from the United States in violation of United States laws.
Embassy of Pakistan, Press Release (July 22, 1987).
183. Wayman, Foreign Aid Packaged for Fiscal '88, Wash. Post, July 30, 1987, at
A17; CONG. Q. ALMANAC, 1987, supra note 146, at 1668; Pakistan Must Act, supra
note 16, at A22.
184. CONG. Q. ALMANAC, 1987, supra note 146, at 1726. The United States
delayed the availability of $340 million earmarked for Pakistan until January 15, 1988.
Id.
185. See Pakistan Faces Woes, supra note 16, at AI5 (reporting that influential
members of Congress were angry over possible Pakistani involvement in the smuggling
incident because some of them played important roles in pushing through the new
Pakistani aid package); CONG. Q. ALMANAC, 1987, supra note 146, at 444, 1728 (cit-
ing that both Senator Glenn and Congressman Fascell requested an aid cutoff to Paki-
stan until Pakistan assured the President that it was not manufacturing a nuclear
bomb); Oberdorfer, Lawmakers Say Aid to Pakistan is in Jeopardy, Wash. Post, July
18, 1987, at A22 (stating that the Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Senator
Pell urged an aid cutoff).
186. CONG. Q. ALMANAC, 1987, supra note 146, at 1726. The United States
wanted concrete evidence that Pakistan was not producing weapons-quality uranium.
1989]
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'
threat of losing valuable assistance, Pakistan refused to meet United
States demands to permit international inspections of its nuclear
facilities.187
The Philadelphia incident required an application of the United
States nonproliferation laws, making aid to Pakistan conditional on two
events. First, the laws required the President to recertify that Pakistan
did not possess a nuclear weapon. 88 Second, the President had to de-
termine whether the 1985 Solarz amendment was violated.' 89 However,
even if a violation was verified, the President could still waive the ter-
mination and permit the restoration of aid under the Glenn
amendment.'
In October 1987, United States officials advised Congress that the
President could not certify with complete reliability that Pakistan did
not possess a nuclear explosive or that it was not producing weapons-
grade material. 9' On December 18, 1987, the Pakistani-born Canadian
was convicted, and the verdict in the case strongly suggested a Pakis-
tani governmental link.' 92 Despite these facts, in mid-December, Presi-
dent Reagan quietly certified'9" and decided that the incident should
not trigger the 1985 Solarz amendment prohibitions." 4
Id. at 1668; Oberdorfer, U.S. Asks Pakistan to Stop Producing Bomb-Grade Uranium,
Wash. Post, July 23, 1987, at A37; Shipler, U.S. Presses Pakistan on Atom Plants,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1987, at A15.
187. Pakistan Spurns Nuclear Inspection, Wash. Post, Aug. 4, 1987, at A10 [here-
inafter Pakistan Spurns Nuclear Inspection]. Pakistani leadership rejected demands
that it open its clandestine nuclear program to international inspection. Id.; see Pursu-
ing Peaceful Nuclear Program, supra note 119, at I (stating that Pakistan rejects uni-
lateral restraints on its nuclear program).
188. 22 U.S.C. § 2375(e) (Supp. IV 1986); CARNEGIE TASK FORCE REPORT:
SOUTH ASIA, supra note 119, at 163.
189. 22 U.S.C. § 2429 (1982) amended by 22 U.S.C. § 2429(a) (Supp. IV 1986);
CARNEGIE TASK FORCE REPORT: SOUTH ASIA, supra note 119, at 163.
190. 22 U.S.C. § 2429(b) (1982); CARNEGIE TASK FORCE REPORT: SOUTil ASIA,
supra note 119, at 163.
191. Caution Urged on Aid to Pakistan, supra note 138, at A14. The Reagan ad-
ministration had reservations about Pakistani assurances that it was not producing en-
riched uranium above the five percent level. Id.
192. Oberdorfer, Conferees Won't Penalize Pakistan, Wash. Post, Dec. 18, 1987,
at A1O [hereinafter Conferees Won't Penalize Pakistan]; Gordon, Businessman Con-
victed in Pakistan Nuclear Plot, N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 1987, at AI5 [hereinafter Busi-
nessman Convicted].
193. Nation Is Quietly Certified As Lacking Nuclear Explosives, Wash. Post, Jan.
15, 1988, at Al [hereinafter Nation Is Quietly Certified]. President Reagan stated that
based on available evidence and the standard set forth in the statute, Pakistan does not
possess a nuclear device. Id. at A24.
194. Id.
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B. EVALUATING UNITED STATES POLICY CHOICES
Pakistan denies a connection to the Philadelphia smuggling affair, a95
but cannot deny other widely known and successful attempts to acquire
and develop nuclear weapons.1 9 8 Consequently, the President consid-
ered triggering the 1985 Solarz amendment to suspend aid earmarked
for Pakistan.
1. Reasons to Support the United States Decision
Three strong arguments support the decision of the United States to
stop short of imposing substantive sanctions on Pakistan. To the Rea-
gan administration, and to Congress, the most important reason was
the desire to secure a United States presence in South Asia to counter
the Soviet military threat.1 97 This rationale also led to United States
support of the Afghan resistance and demonstrated that the Afghani-
stan situation ultimately took priority over concerns regarding Paki-
stan's nuclear program. 9 The United States considered Pakistan an
important ally in that it provided the major supply route to the guerril-
las resisting the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.""'
Termination of aid may have led to a decision by President Zia to
recalculate the risks involved in supporting the Afghan resistance. 200
195. Pakistan Must Act, supra note 16, at A22; Weintraub, Pakistan Denies Con-
nection To Any Nuclear-Export Plot, Wash. Post, July 22, 1987, at Al [hereinafter
Pakistan Denies Connection]; see Embassy of Pakistan, Press Release, (July 22, 1987)
(reiterating that the government of Pakistan denies any connection to the nuclear ex-
port plot).
196. CARNEGIE TASK FORCE REPORT: SOUTH ASIA, supra note 119, at 49; see THE
EUROPA YEAR BOOK 1984: A WORLD SURVEY 1039, 2193 (1984) (reporting that in
response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the United States bolstered the
military position of Pakistan to counter the Soviet offensive in the region).
197. Businessman Convicted, supra note 192, at A15. The United States publicly
objects to Pakistani nuclear activities but gives priority to resisting the Soviet influence
in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistani A-Bomb Seen Likely, supra note 138, at Al.
198. CARNEGIE TASK FORCE REPORT. SOUTH ASIA, supra note 119, at 50; CONG.
Q. ALMANAC, 1987, supra note 146, at 1668; Doerner, supra note 8, at 42. Pakistan
serves as the arms conduit for more than 100,000 United States-supported guerilla
fighters in Afghanistan. Id. at 43. Pakistan also acts as a pipeline for several hundreds
of millions of dollars in CIA covert assistance to the Afghan rebels. Pakistan Near
Atom Arms Production, supra note 138, at A16. Pakistan also cooperates with CIA
intelligence activities near the Soviet Union. Id.
199. Pakistan's Nuclear Insurance, supra note 16, at A23; Pakistan Denies Con-
nection, supra note 195, at A31; Pakistan Faces Woes, supra note 16, at A10. The
United States considers withholding aid too high a security risk. Doerner, supra note 8,
at 43.
200. Ottaway, U.S. Expediting Missiles for Pakistan's Defenses, Wash. Post, July
11, 1985, at A25; Weisman, Russians Said to Step Up Air and Artillery Attacks In-
side Pakistan, N.Y. Times, May 15, 1985, at A8; Pakistan Faces Woes, supra note 16,
at Al. There are over 100,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Id. Because of the im-
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Yet, Soviet attacks on Afghan refugee camps located in Pakistan re-
vealed that Pakistan was also vulnerable to a Soviet military threat.2"'
Soviet military presence suggested that Pakistan could not afford to
alienate itself completely from the United States. 02 Nevertheless, the
Reagan administration argued that an aid cutoff would jeopardize the
United States interrelated goals of supporting both Pakistan and the
Afghan rebels against Soviet pressure.20 3
Arguably, the recent signing of the Geneva Accords vindicates the
decision of the United States to continue providing aid to Pakistan. In
April 1988, Pakistan, the United States, the Soviet Union, and Af-
ghanistan concluded agreements to end the conflict in Afghanistan.0 4
These agreements should enable the United States to shift its priority
away from Afghanistan toward Pakistan and the nuclear issue. The
agreements, collectively known as the Geneva Accords, 05 were com-
pleted after General Zia, who opposed them,208 succumbed to heavy
mense Soviet presence in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union, for the first time, poses a
direct military threat to Pakistan. CARNEGIE TASK FORCE REPORT: SOUTH ASIA, supra
note 119, at 47. See T. ELIOT & R. PFALTZGRAFF, supra note 142 (setting forth differ-
ent perceptions of the Soviet threat to Pakistan).
201. Carrot and Stick Policy, supra note 3, at 46; see SPECTOR, NUCLEAR NA-
TIONS, supra note 8, at 116-17 (stating that President Zia is dependent on the United
States for arms and political support because of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan);
Betts, supra note 62, at 349-53 (explaining that because of its need for economic and
military aid, Pakistan cannot afford to alienate itself from its important allies, such as
the United States).
202. Pakistani A-Bomb Seen Likely, supra note 175, at Al. Congress was also
determined to continue supporting Pakistan because of its vital role concerning the
Afghanistan situation. Conferees Won't Penalize Pakistan, supra note 192, at AI0.
203. See CARNEGIE TASK FORCE REPORT: SOUTH ASIA, supra note 119, at 51
(stating that one of the arguments for United States military aid to Pakistan is that it
slows down the nuclear program in Pakistan); Haass, Give Pakistan Aid, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 28, 1987, at A31 [hereinafter Give Pakistan Aid] (asserting that aid gives the
United States leverage because recipients know that they jeopardize aid when they
either develop weapons or seek to acquire key nuclear technology in this country).
204. Klass, Afghanistan: The Accords, 66 FOREIGN AFF. 922, 922-45 (1988). On
April 14, 1988, four agreements were reached to settle the conflict in Afghanistan: (1)
the Bilateral Agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan on the Principles of Mu-
tual Relations, in particular on Non-Interference and Non-Intervention; (2) the U.S.-
U.S.S.R. Declaration on International Guarantees; (3) the Bilateral Agreement be-
tween Afghanistan and Pakistan on the Voluntary Return of Refugees; and (4) the
Agreement on the Interrelationship for the Settlement of the situation relating to Af-
ghanistan. Afghanistan-Pakistan-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics-United States:
Accord on the Peaceful Resolution of the Situation in Afghanistan, 27 I.L.M. 577,
577 (1988).
205. Id. at 922.
206. MacFarguhar, Pakistan After Zia, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Aug. 29,
1988, at 75 [hereinafter Pakistan After Zia]. General Zia believed that the Geneva
Accords did not adequately meet the needs and concerns of Pakistan. Id. at 76. He
believed that the Accords neither removed the Soviet-supported government in Kabul
nor secured the resettlement of the three million refugees from Pakistan. Id. General
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pressure and reluctantly agreed to sign.2 "
In principal, each of the major actors under the Accords agreed to
stop interfering in the Afghan affairs."' The Soviet Union agreed to
withdraw its troops from Afghanistan. 0 9 The United States, in turn,
promised to stop supplying arms to the Afghan rebels.210 In addition,
Pakistan pledged not to interfere with the Soviet-backed government in
Afghanistan211 and to return the 3.5 million Afghan refugees in Paki-
stan.212 Under the leadership of Najibullah, the Afghan government
agreed to cease interfering with Pakistan's affairs.21 3
A second argument against imposing substantive sanctions against
Pakistan contends that United States military aid to Pakistan helps to
restrain that country's nuclear program. 21 4 President Reagan believed
that the security assistance program was the most effective way to cur-
tail Pakistani nuclear activities.215 The Reagan administration argued
that military aid relieved the security fears that motivated Pakistan to
pursue nuclear weapons. 16 A cutoff would endanger this perceived lev-
Zia hoped that a settlement would include the establishment of a new Afghan govern-
ment. Id.; see Klass, supra note 204, at 935 (describing that Pakistan wanted an inde-
pendent government approved by a majority of the Afghans).
207. Pakistan After Zia, supra note 206, at 76. The United States, the civilian
Pakistani government, and several allies pressured Zia to sign the Accords. Id. In addi-
tion, the Soviet Union launched a campaign of terrorism and sabotage against Pakistan
to pressure Zia to sign. Klass, supra note 204, at 933.
208. Anderson, Behr & Moreau, Who Killed General Zia?, NEWSWEEK:, Aug. 29,
1988, at 33 [hereinafter Who Killed General Zia?].
209. Klass, supra note 204, at 923. The Accords do not specify procedures for en-
forcement or verification, giving the Soviets flexibility and no accountability. Id. at 924.
210. Watson, Barry, Cullen, Barnathan, Strasser, and Moreau, With Blood in
Their Eyes, NEWSWEEK, April 18, 1988, at 28.
211. Klass, supra note 204, at 922-23. The bilateral agreement between Afghani-
stan and Pakistan on the Principles of Mutual Relations prohibits Pakistan's interfer-
ence in Afghanistan including support for the Afghan resistance. Id.
212. Id. at 923-24. The bilateral agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan on
the Voluntary Return of Refugees envisions the return of the Afghan refugees within
18 months, however, the Agreement fails to specify how to deal with refugees who
choose to remain in Pakistan. Id. at 924.
213. Id. at 922.
214. Nation is Quietly Certified, supra note 193, at A24. The Reagan administra-
tion's assessment, however, came at a time when intelligence reports existed that indi-
cated that Pakistan produced weapons-grade enriched uranium at its Kahuta plant. Id.
215. Carrot and Stick Policy, supra note 3, at 43; Cross & Smith, supra note 13,
at 659. See CARNEGIE TASK FORCE REPORT. SOUTH ASIA, supra note 119, at 51 (ar-
guing that United States aid allows Pakistan to modernize its military as a deterrent
against India). But see Betts, supra note 62, at 350 (contending that massive military
aid is necessary for the aid to substantially reduce the security motives of Pakistan as a
nuclear deterrent). See also supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text (discussing the
strategic fears of Pakistan).
216. See supra notes 214-15 and accompanying text (discussing President Rea-
gan's arms strategy toward Pakistan).
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erage and would reinforce the belief of Pakistan that nuclear indepen-
dence was desirable.21 7
In the past, however, aid packages have not successfully caused
Pakistani leaders to change their nuclear policy or philosophy.", For
example, after President Reagan's 1981 aid package, Pakistan com-
pleted its uranium enrichment plant 219 and has since reportedly pro-
duced weapons-grade material at the plant.220 This casts serious doubts
on the effectiveness of the Reagan administration's aid strategy.
One final argument against imposing sanctions asserts that an un-
evenly applied United States nuclear export standard would create an
international double standard.2 1 The United States recognizes that it
has not punished governments which have pursued more ambitious nu-
clear programs.222 United States efforts to induce Pakistan to abandon
its nuclear efforts were hampered because of the United States re-
strained reaction to the Indian nuclear test 223 and United States passiv-
ity to the Israeli nuclear program. 24 The United States failed to apply
217. Pakistan's Nuclear Insurance, supra note 16, at A23; Give Pakistan Aid,
supra note 203, at Al; see Hussain, Why Pakistan Needs a Nuclear Option, Wash.
Post, July 29, 1987, at A23 [hereinafter Why Pakistan Needs a Nuclear Option] (ar-
guing that the elimination of United States aid would destabilize a weak civilian gov-
ernment in Pakistan); Betts, supra note 62, at 354 (purporting that an aid termination
would reinforce the Pakistani view that nuclear weapons are needed to compensate for
conventional inferiority against India); Oberdorfer, U.S. Aid to Pakistan Ends as
Waiver of Nuclear-Laws Expire, Wash. Post, Oct. 1, 1987, at A23 (indicating that the
Central Intelligence Agency believes that the termination of aid would not deter Paki-
stan from obtaining nuclear weapons capability, and would undermine United States
anti-proliferation efforts).
218. See Cross & Smith, supra note 13, at 659 (claiming that no support exists for
the assessment of the Reagan administration that expanded aid gave the United States
increased influence over Pakistan's nuclear program); Carrot and Stick Policy, supra
note 3, at 44-45 (revealing that massive aid did not result in concrete assurances from
Pakistan that it will submit to international safeguards or open up its Kahuta plant to
inspection).
219. See supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text (reporting on the development
of the Kahuta enrichment plant).
220. See supra note 175 and accompanying text (confirming that United States
intelligence reports show that Pakistan produced weapons-grade material at its Kahuta
plant since approximately 1980).
221. Why Pakistan Needs a Nuclear Option, supra note 216, at A I0.
222. CARNEGIE TASK FORCE REPORT: SOUTH ASIA, supra note 119, at 5. For ex-
ample, the United States did not pursue efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear
weapons with the same intensity in all countries. Id. For example, the United States
did not penalize Israel for its aggressive nuclear program.
223. YAGER, INCENTIVES AND CAPABILITIES, supra note 3, at 419. See supra notes
65-68 and accompanying text (discussing the United States reaction to India's nuclear
test).
224. Id. at 419 n.8. Israel is the most advanced nuclear state in the Middle East.
REPORT OF THE U.S. PANEL ON NEW APPROACHES TO NON-PROLIFERATION, Blocking
the Spread of Nuclear Weapons 28 (1986). The Israelis developed nuclear technology
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its nonproliferation laws such as the Symington amendment or the
1985 Solarz amendment against either India or Israel.22 In effect, the
United States ignored the nuclear activities of these countries. The
laws, arguably were not intended to treat Pakistan's less-developed pro-
gram with the same ambivalent attitude.22
2. Reasons to Support the 1985 Solarz Amendment
Although the arguments against the United States enforcement of
the 1985 Solarz Amendment are persuasive, even stronger reasons exist
for invoking the law. Pakistan continues to breach its commitments to
the United States and to violate United States nonproliferation laws.
The 1987 Philadelphia incident involving the Pakistani-born Canadian
followed the very publicized 1984 incident involving the attempted ex-
port of nuclear technology to Pakistan.221 The tensions between the
United States and Pakistan resulting from the 1984 incident led to
Pakistani promises to refrain from producing weapons-grade mate-
rial.2 Pakistan, however, continued to attempt the manufacture of nu-
clear weapons and violated its promise to President Reagan that it
would not produce enriched uranium.229 President Zia's verbal assur-
ances were no longer in good faith and, thus, the United States would
have good cause to invoke its restrictions."'
to deter a conventional attack from one of their hostile neighbors. Id. at 29. Israel has
the nuclear material and capability to develop a nuclear bomb. Id. Moreover, Israel is
presumed capable of manufacturing nuclear warheads and has the weapon technology
to deliver these warheads to nearby targets. Id. Israel, however, has avoided interna-
tional commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons. Id.
Israel represents the most obvious failure of official United States nonproliferation
policy. Id.; CARNEGIE TASK FORCE REPORT: SOUTH ASIA, supra note 119, at 5. The
United States has received criticism for refusing to use its leverage to restrain the nu-
clear program in Israel. Id. While the United States has attacked other nuclear powers
for disregarding international norms against nuclear arming, it has left Israel alone. Id.
225. Why Pakistan Needs a Nuclear Option, supra note 216, at AI0; but see Ro-
senfeld, Pakistan's Nuclear Insurance, Wash. Post, July 31, 1987, at A23 (stating that
the 1985 Solarz Amendment does not compel the United States to penalize India and
Israel for their advanced programs).
226. Pakistan's Nuclear Insurance, supra note 223, at AI0; see supra notes 168-83
and accompanying text (explaining that the 1985 Solarz Amendment attempted to dis-
suade Pakistan from continuing its smuggling activities).
227. See supra notes 162-67 and accompanying text (discussing the 1984 case in-
volving the attempted export of electronic switches used to detonate nuclear explosives
to Pakistan).
228. See supra note 165 and accompanying text (discussing President Zia's
promises in the aftermath of the 1984 smuggling case).
229. See supra note 165-66 and accompanying text (citing mounting evidence that
Pakistan has broken its promise to President Reagan not to produce weapons-grade
material).
230. Pell, Get Tough with Pakistan, Wash. Post, Aug. 5, 1987, at A23 [hereinafter
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In addition, Pakistan blatantly violated United States nonprolifera-
tion laws, in particular the 1985 Solarz Amendment. The amendment
specifically mandates the termination of aid to any country that ille-
gally attempts to export nuclear equipment, material, or technology
from the United States. 31 In 1985, Congress enacted this amendment
as a warning to Pakistan that the continued participation in smuggling
activities would jeopardize American aid.232 Pakistan, nonetheless, gave
little consideration to this warning. Pakistan's entanglement in the
smuggling affair mandated the application of the 1985 Solarz amend-
ment.2 3 For the United States nonproliferation laws to have any prac-
tical value, they must be enforced where clear violations exist.
Furthermore, the willingness of the United States to accommodate
Pakistani double-dealing on the nuclear issue is harmful to the global
nonproliferation policy of the United States. The failure of the United
States to hold Pakistan accountable for its conduct reflects directly
upon the credibility of the nonproliferation policy of the United States,
both in the region and elsewhere,23 4 as it sends out a strong message to
Pakistan and the world that the United States is not willing to enforce
its nonproliferation policy.23 5
Although unilaterally the United States cannot stop the development
of a nuclear explosive in Pakistan, the enforcement of its nonprolifera-
tion laws will enable it to increase the credibility of its anti-prolifera-
tion rhetoric."' The failure of the United States to use its leverage to
Get Tough With Pakistan]; see Pakistan and the Smugglers, Wash. Post, July 27,
1987, at A23 (stating that evidence exists to suggest that Pakistan is increasing the
enrichment level up to weapons grade).
231. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2429 (1982) amended by 22 U.S.C. § 2429(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
232. See supra notes 170-77 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of the
1985 Solarz Amendment on Pakistan).
233. See Get Tough With Pakistan, supra note 229, at A23 (advocating the elimi-
nation of aid to Pakistan in light of its nuclear activities); see also CARNEGIE TASK
FORCE REPORT: SOUTH ASIA, supra note 119, at 131-36 (stating that a majority of a
task force comprised of American nonproliferation experts recommends that the Presi-
dent withhold at least a portion of the aid Congress has authorized for Pakistan).
234. Get Tough With Pakistan, supra note 230, at A23. The United States reac-
tion to recent Pakistani nuclear activities will undermine the credibility of other non-
proliferation initiatives in the region. CARNEGIE TASK FORCE REPORT: SOUTH ASIA,
supra note 119, at 134.
235. Ausness, supra note 5, at 105. In 1981, when the United States lifted trade
sanctions on Pakistan, less developed countries viewed this event as evidence that the
United States could not enforce its nonproliferation policies. Id. Shipping uranium fuel
to India without full-scope safeguards, regardless of the mandate of the NNPA, also
reflected upon the United States inability to impose its policies in the Third World. Id.
236. See Crawford, Glenn Asks Reagan to Halt Pakistan Aid Pending Review of
Nuclear Programs, 35 SCIENCE 1321, 1321 (1987) (citing Senator Glenn's statement
that the United States should take a firmer stand with Pakistan, or other countries will
view the United States nonproliferation policy as a mere facade).
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slow the emergence of a Pakistani nuclear bomb could have long-term
negative repercussions on the nuclear policies of other countries,"' be-
cause the acquisition of nuclear weapons in high risk countries such as
Pakistan dramatically increases the risk of proliferation.2 38
III. RECOMMENDATION
A. A SHORT-TERM RESPONSE
For the above reasons, Congress, with the support of President Rea-
gan, should have taken concrete steps from the beginning to enhance
American nonproliferation efforts in Pakistan. The key to reducing nu-
clear weapon capability in Pakistan is to stop Pakistan's efforts to pro-
duce weapons-grade material and thus stop short of de facto nuclear
armament.2 39 If Pakistan continues developing its nuclear weapon ca-
pability, India, in response, will actively pursue nuclear weapons.24 0 If
both nuclear arsenals grow, pressure will mount for further militariza-
tion of their weapons programs, and the prospects for effective regional
nonproliferation will diminish.41 It is urgent, therefore, to restrain Pa-
kistan from any further militarization of its nuclear weapon
capability. 4 2
In fall 1987, there was general support for placing restrictions on the
renewal of aid to Pakistan.243 One proposed piece of legislation would
237. Yager, Incentives and Capabilities, supra note 3, at 412. Proliferation in one
country increases the risk of proliferation in other countries. Id. For example, the ac-
quisition of nuclear weapons in China encouraged India to develop a nuclear weapons
program, and the Indian nuclear test created a strong desire in Pakistan to acquire
nuclear weapons. Id.
238. See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text (discussing high risk countries
such as Pakistan that have acquired nuclear weapons).
239. Spector, Averting a Race to a Nuclear Armageddon, 129 FAR E. ECON. REv.,
Sept. 26, 1985, at 37 [hereinafter Spector, Averting a Race]; CARNEGIE TASK FORCE
REPORT: SOUTH AsIA, supra note 119, at 132. The administration wants Pakistan to
permit outside inspection of its Kahuta nuclear plant in hopes of easing United States-
Pakistan relations over nuclear weapons proliferation. U.S. Asks Pakistan to Stop Pro-
ducing, supra note 16, at A34.
240. Spector, Averting a Race, supra note 239, at 37 (1985); Doerner, supra note
8, at 42.
241. CARNEGIE TASK FORCE REPORT: SOUTH AsIA, supra note 119, at 132-33.
242. Get Tough with Pakistan, supra note 230, at A23; Conferees Won't Penalize
Pakistan, supra note 192, at A10.
243. Pakistan Must Act, supra note 16, at A22. Suggestions for dealing with the
Pakistani affair included: (1) requiring periodic international inspections of all of the
nuclear facilities in Pakistan; (2) insisting on Pakistan's acceptance of the 1968 non-
proliferation treaty; (3) demanding that Pakistan prohibit ongoing efforts to illegally
acquire sensitive nuclear materials and technology; and (4) arranging for United States
officials to check with certainty the extent of the enrichment of uranium in Pakistan.
Id. The Reagan administration chose not to adopt any of these measures. Id. But See
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have required the President to terminate aid unless he could determine
"on the basis of the best available information" that Pakistan had not
exceeded the five percent enriched uranium threshold level. 2 4 This
standard would require Pakistan to accept periodic international on-site
inspections of its nuclear facilities.245 Pakistan's agreement to permit
international inspection of its uranium enrichment plant would have
eased the United States-Pakistan confrontation over nuclear weapons
proliferation. 46
The Reagan administration and congressional opponents of the pro-
posed legislation, however, stated that Pakistan would not comply, and
that aid termination would seriously damage United States-Pakistan
relations.247 In late 1987, as hopes of an Afghan settlement emerged, a
consensus evolved against the legislation. 4 s Instead of sanctions, an
agreement was reached to provide continued aid to Pakistan with no
new nonproliferation conditions attached.249
Rather than facing the prospect of a future Pakistani nuclear test,
the United States relies on "verifiable" evidence that Pakistan is not
producing weapons-grade material. 5 Until Pakistan actually meets
this condition, however, Congress should withhold all or a substantial
portion of the authorized aid.25' Clearly, no guarantee exists that
United States aid, or lack thereof, will yield enough leverage to force
Nation is Quietly Certified, supra note 193, at Al (stating that President Reagan is
likely to continue aid to Pakistan without any restraints).
244. Caution Urged on Aid to Pakistan, supra note 138, at A14. Rep. Stephen J.
Solarz (D-N.Y.) introduced the legislation to suspend aid in the House; Sen. John
Glenn (D-Ohio) introduced similar legislation in the Senate. Id.
245. Id.
246. U.S. Asks Pakistan to Stop Producing, supra note 16, at A37.
247. CARNEGIE TASK FORCE REPORT: SOUTH ASIA, supra note 119, at 131. Paki-
stan consistently refused to open its nuclear plant to international inspection before
India agreed to do the same. Pakistan Spurns Nuclear Inspection, supra note 187, at
A10.
248. Oberdorfer, Conferees Won't Penalize Pakistan, supra note 192, at AI0;
CARNEGIE TASK FORCE REPORT: SOUTH ASIA, supra note 119, at 131. After the meet-
ing in December 1987 between Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and Presi-
dent Reagan, the United States felt encouraged that a settlement of the Afghan situa-
tion might occur. Id. With these hopes, the United States backed away from legislation
that could disrupt United States-Pakistan relations. Id.
249. See CARNEGIE TASK FORCE REPORT: SOUTH ASIA, supra note 119, at 134
(stressing that United States inaction in the face of recent Pakistani activities under-
mines United States initiatives in the region).
250. See Pakistan Spurns Nuclear Inspection, supra note 187, at AIO (showing
that in August, the House of Representatives adopted a nonbinding resolution to cut off
United States military aid to Pakistan unless Pakistan could produce "verifiable" evi-
dence that it had not produced and was not producing weapons-grade material).
251. Reagan Likely to Approve Aid, supra note 193, at Al.
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Pakistan to cease production of weapons-grade uranium.22 Neverthe-
less, United States passivity to recent nuclear activities in Pakistan
may undermine future efforts of the United States to curtail the nu-
clear program in Pakistan.253
A realistic hope exists that Pakistan will suspend production of
weapons-grade material instead of losing valuable United States assis-
tance.254 United States military aid has helped Pakistan continue mod-
ernizing its conventional forces.2 55 Furthermore, as long as domestic in-
stability and regional insecurity persist in Pakistan, any Pakistani
government will need continued United States diplomatic support. 35
Finally, although these measures put a freeze on the nuclear weapon
program in Pakistan, they are not unreasonable because Pakistan's nu-
clear option can remain essentially intact.257
If the United States decides to withhold aid, the possibility exists
that the Pakistani government will refuse to succumb to United States
pressure and that heightened tensions between the United States and
Pakistan could arise.258 While this possibility exists, it remains unlikely
that Pakistan will seriously jeopardize continued United States aid.258
United States assistance in the Afghan situation served Pakistani stra-
tegic and political interests.260 In fact, Pakistan provided aid to the Af-
ghan rebels even before the United States gave major assistance to Pa-
252. See Yager, Incentives and Capabilities, supra note 3, at 351-53 (stating that
in 1981, the Symington Amendment put over $144 million in aid at risk, but Pakistan
remained unreceptive to United States nonproliferation demands). The United States
has not fully exercised its leverage over Pakistan to pursue nonproliferation objectives
because of other foreign policy concerns. Cross & Smith, supra note 13, at 657-58.
253. See CARNEGIE TAsK FORCE REPORT: SOUTH ASIA, supra note 119, at 134
(stating that the United States should cut off, at a minimum, a portion of its aid to
Pakistan). At a minimum, the President should prevent delivery of certain advanced
conventional weapon systems that are more appropriate for use in conflicts with India
than for the defense of Pakistan's Afghan frontier. Id. This would enable the United
States to avoid the actions that unnecessarily exacerbate the tensions in the region. Id.
at 117.
254. Id. at 134.
255. Rais, supra note 10, at 471; CARNEGIE TASK FORCE REPORT. SOUTH ASIA,
supra note 119, at 134.
256. CARNEGIE TASK FORCE REPORT. SOUTH ASIA, supra note 119, at 134.
257. Id. (stating that United States financial assistance is an important source of
patronage for the Pakistani government).
258. See id. at 135 (stressing that the nuclear option of Pakistan is retained even if
it ceases to produce weapons-grade uranium).
259. See id. at 135 (recognizing that a reduction in United States assistance could
have negative repercussions for United States-Pakistan relations). An aid cutoff would
fuel anti-United States propaganda and reinforce an image of the United States as
unreliable. Why Pakistan Needs a Nuclear Option, supra note 216, at A23.
260. See CARNEGIE TASK FORCE REPORT. SOUTH ASIA, supra note 119, at 135
(stating that Pakistan would remain committed to the Afghan resistance even if the
United States cut off aid).
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kistan.2 61 Given the importance of attempting to curb the development
of nuclear weapons in this tense region, whatever risks to United
States-Pakistan relations exist are worth taking.282
B. A LOOK TOWARD THE FUTURE
Pakistan is unlikely to give the United States a firm renouncement of
its nuclear option until its security position in South Asia improves dra-
matically. 63 The security tension in the region stems in large part from
the continued adversarial nature of the Indian-Pakistan relationship."'
This is exacerbated by the military presence of the superpowers and
this alone makes unilateral nuclear restraint difficult and creates obsta-
cles for bilateral Indian-Pakistani nuclear negotiations.
The best hopes for deterring proliferation lie in resolving these na-
tional tensions. For the United States to play an integral role, it must
first become more sensitive to the desires, aspirations, and policy goals
of India and Pakistan. 65 In this way, the United States would enhance
its ability to facilitate the adoption of confidence-building measures by
India and Pakistan and to dissuade each country from beginning a nu-
clear arms race.2 66
CONCLUSION
At present, while the United States clearly articulates its policy to
check the spread of nuclear weapons, it does not in practice effectively
apply its rules. Consequently, United States policy lacks credibility in
261. Id.; Get Tough with Pakistan, supra note 230, at A23. The continued Soviet
occupation in Afghanistan is a threat to Pakistan. Id.
262. See CARNEGIE TASK FORCE REPORT: SOUTH ASIA, supra note 119, at 135
(agreeing that the United States should take risks regarding its interests in Afghani-
stan in order to stop the prospects for proliferation in South Asia). The Soviet with-
drawal from Afghanistan would remove the major rationale for continued United
States assistance to Pakistan and encourage the United States to take aggressive non-
proliferation steps to reduce the possibility of a South Asian nuclear arms race. Id.
263. Cronin, supra note 122, at 612. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying
text (discussing Pakistan's security problems).
264. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text (outlining the history of In-
dian-Pakistan relations).
265. SIPRI: PREVENTING PROLIFERATION, supra note 6, at 24.
266. Betts, supra note 3, at 339-45. Among the most frequently made suggestions
to increase regional stability and reduce suspicion between the two countries are: (1)
create a nuclear free zone in South Asia similar to one in Latin America; (2) promote
a joint Indian-Pakistan peaceful nuclear energy venture; (3) establish multilateral se-
curity agreements; or (4) develop international cooperative measures that can force
consensual restrictions on India and Pakistan to renounce their efforts to build nuclear
bombs. See CARNEGIE TASK FORCE REPORT: SOUTH ASIA, supra note 119, at 89-135
(describing in depth the costs and benefits of each proposal).
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South Asia.26 The indulgent attitude of the United States toward
countries like Pakistan increases global prospects for widespread
proliferation. In allowing Pakistan to circumvent clear United States
policy objectives, the United States effectively abandoned its traditional
commitment to preventing the risk of proliferation in the third world. A
stronger commitment to its articulated nonproliferation objectives will
provide the United States with greater leverage in dealing more suc-
cessfully with potential proliferants.
The Geneva Accords did not, as hoped, result in the immediate reso-
lution of the Afghan conflict.268 Each party accuses the others for vio-
lating the provisions of the Accords.269 Under the arrangement, the So-
viets have begun to withdraw their troops;270 the fighting, however,
continues. 17 ' Nevertheless, many in the United States see the with-
drawal of Soviet troops as a victory over Soviet expansionism. 27 2 With
Soviet hegemony in South Asia halted, the United States might stop
perceiving Pakistan as the front-line state it once did in the struggle for
273 thcontrol in the region. While the Reagan administration will continue
to provide generous military aid to Pakistan, the newly elected adminis-
tration beginning in January 1989 will have the opportunity to shift the
United States priority back to the nuclear nonproliferation issue with-
out sacrificing other regional objectives. 4
267. CARNEGIE TASK FORCE REPORT: SOUTH ASIA, supra note 119, at 134; Yager,
Incentives and Capabilities, supra note 3, at 407; see supra notes 228-32 and accompa-
nying text (stressing that the willingness of the United States to accommodate Pakistan
on the nuclear issue is harmful to the global nonproliferation policy of the United
States).
268. Liu, Waiting for the Siege, NEWSWEEK, May 30, 1988, at 41 [hereinafter
Waiting for the Siege].
269. Who Killed General Zia?, supra note 208, at 33. The Soviets and the Afghans
assert that Pakistan continued to supply American arms to the rebels. Id. The United
States alleges that the Soviets provide military aid to the Afghan government in direct
violation of the Accords. Id.; see Waiting for the Seige, supra note 268, at 41 (indicat-
ing that the bloodshed in Afghanistan will continue in spite of the agreements).
270. Who Killed General Zia?, supra note 208, at 35. United Nations observers
noted that, pursuant to the Accords, the Soviet Union met its initial deadline for with-
drawing half of its stationed troops from Afghanistan. Id.
271. Id. (noting that the Afghan conflict is far from over).
272. Klass, supra note 204, at 925; see Who Killed General Zia?, supra note 208,
at 35 (stating that the United States hopes that once the Soviets withdraw their troops,
they will not return to Afghanistan).
273. See Pakistan After Zia, supra note 206, at 77 (recognizing that nonprolifera-
tion goals will gain importance in United States policymaking once Pakistan is no
longer deemed a key to anti-Soviet strategy).
274. Lost Linch-pin, EcONOMIsT, Aug. 20, 1988, at 13 [hereinafter Lost Linch-pin]
(stating that the United States may approach Pakistan differently as the latter evolves
into a less significant participant in the Afghan conflict).
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POSTSCRIPT
The mysterious death of General Zia,278 the single most powerful
political figure in Pakistan, on August 17, 1988, is likely to weaken
Pakistan militarily and politically. 76 General Zia,277 a shrewd politi-
cian, and the chief advocate of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program,
was able to successfully withstand United States pressure to curtail his
country's covert nuclear weapons program .2 7  Although many political
leaders in the United States feel they have lost one of its most impor-
tant allies in South Asia,279 Zia's successor will be largely preoccupied
with establishing internal control280 and, thus, may be potentially more
susceptible than Zia was to United States anti-proliferation pressure.
The United States should begin to play a stronger role in the nuclear
weapons decisionmaking process in Pakistan. The successor govern-
ment, at least initially, is likely to be more dependent on foreign aid.2 81
Retaining a strong relationship with the United States will remain an
important priority for any Pakistani government.28 2 Furthermore, while
the United States will continue to provide aid to Pakistan, the resolu-
tion of the Afghan war could result in the United States shifting priori-
ties vis-a-vis Pakistan on the nuclear issue.28 3 As a condition of future
275. Who Killed General Zia?, supra note 208, at 30. General Zia died in an air-
plane explosion. Id. The circumstances surrounding his death have created speculation
that sabotage was involved as Zia had many enemies abroad that might have wanted
him dead. Id. The list of potential suspects includes the Soviet Union, the puppet So-
viet government in Afghanistan, and India. Id. Internally, religious adversaries, politi-
cal opponents, and military rivals are also suspects. Id. See, Serrill, Death in the Skies,
TIME, Aug. 29, 1988, at 33 [hereinafter Death in the Skies] (discussing the suspects in
the investigation of Zia's death).
276. See Pakistan After Zia, supra note 206, at 75-77 (discussing Pakistan in the
aftermath of Zia's death); Death in the Skies, supra note 275, at 32-33 (indicating
that Zia's sudden death leaves Pakistan in a precarious and unstable situation).
277. Death in the Skies, supra note 275, at 29. General Zia used the Afghan war
as a tool for generating massive United States aid. Id. at 32; Pakistan After Zia, supra
note 206, at 76.
278. Weisman, What Zia's Death Means For Pakistan and the U.S., N.Y. Times,
Aug. 21, 1988, at B1. See supra notes 178-81 (revealing that Pakistan has continued to
receive aid despite Zia's covert operations in the United States to obtain illegally nu-
clear technology).
279. See Who Killed General Zia, supra note 208, at 30 (stating that the United
States lost its most important ally in the region just as the United States-Pakistan joint
anti-Soviet strategy in Afghanistan was paying off with the withdrawal of Soviet
troops); Pakistan After Zia, supra note 206, at 76 (indicating that Zia shared United
States concerns over the Soviet presence in Afghanistan).
280. Pakistan After Zia, supra note 206, at 76.
281. Id. at 77.
282. Id.
283. Lost Linch-pin, supra note 274, at 13. See Weymouth, Who Killed Pakistan's
Zia: The Fears and the Theories, Wash. Post, Aug. 28, 1988, at B4 (stating that the
United States policy toward Pakistan is shifting away from the Afghanistan situation
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United States aid, the new Pakistani leadership could be susceptible to
renewed pressure to make substantive arrangements to curtail its nu-
clear program.8 4
One must recognize, however, that with the sudden death of Zia,
Pakistan's regional insecurities certainly remain, and perhaps will even
heighten. 8 5 Arguably, under these conditions, no successor Pakistani
leader can afford to completely disavow the nuclear program without
meaningful assurances from India to do the same.280 Therefore, guar-
antee exists that the next Pakistani leader will refrain from continued
development of the country's nuclear program. Yet, the United States,
must continue to play a strategic role in reducing the incentives Paki-
stan has for developing nuclear weapon capability.
to the nuclear issue).
284. Pakistan after Zia, supra note 206, at 77.
285. Id.; see supra notes 278-82 (discussing how Zia's sudden death left Pakistan
without a strong government).
286. Id.; see Aiyas, An Enemy's Grief is Seldom Shared, U.S. NEws & WORLD
REPORT, Aug. 29, 1988, at 76 (stating that Indian political leaders believe that the
successor will continue to develop the nuclear option).
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